The Impact of Revised Article 9 by Lupica, Lois R
University of Maine School of Law
University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2005
The Impact of Revised Article 9
Lois R. Lupica
University of Maine School of Law, lupica@maine.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-
publications
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.
Suggested Bluebook Citation
Lois R. Lupica, The Impact of Revised Article 9, 93 Ky. L.J. 867 (2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications/57
The Impact of Revised Article 9 

BY LOIS R. LUPI CA• 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 868 

II. REVISED ARTICLE 9 ...................................................................... 873 

A. Secured Credit-Related Changes ........................................ 873 

I. 	 New Article 9 Assets ................................................... 875 

a. Health-care Insurance Receivables ................. 875 

b. Commercial Tort Claims .................................. 876 

c. 	 Payment Intangibles ......................................... 877 

d. Deposit Accounts ............................................. 878 

2. 	 Relaxation ofAsset Transfer Restrictions ................... 880 

3. 	 Expansion ofProceeds Definition .............................. 880 

4. 	 Purchase-Money Security Interests ........................... 881 

5. 	 Default and Foreclosure under Revised Article 9 ...... 882 

B. 	 Article 9's Securitization Revisions ..................................... 882 

C. 	 Article 9 's Procedural Revisions ......................................... 887 

1. 	 Single Place to File and Supergeneric 

Descriptions ......................................... : ...................... 887 

2. Tw~Tier Perfection Rules ......................................... 888 

Ill. THEORY AND REVISED ARTICLE 9 .............................................. 890 

A. 	 The Theoretical Defense ofRevised Article 9 ...................... 890 

B. 	 A Competing Vision ............................................................. 891 

IV. BEYOND THEORY TO EMPIRICISM .............................................. 892 

A. Empiricism v. Theory - The Case ofDurrett....................... 892 

B. Empiricism and Revised Article 9 ....................................... 894 

V. REVISED ARTICLE 9 AND BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY THEORY ...... 897 

A. Critics ofJudicially Supervised Reorganization ................. 897 

B. The Value ofReorganization............................................... 899 

1. 	 The Worst Case - Article 9 's Impact in 

Bankruptcy.................................................................. 902 

a. Debtor-in-Bankruptcy's Cash Flow ............... 902 

• Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S. 1981, Cornell 
University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Peter 
Alexander, Jean Braucher, Melissa Cross, David Nowlin, Deborah Tuerkheimer, Jennifer 
Wriggins, and especially Karen Gross for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. Thanks also to Barbara Taylor and Zachary Greenfield, University of Maine 
School of Law Class of 2004, and Christine Hepler, Interim Director and Research 
Librarian, Garbrecht Law Library, for excellent research assistance. I am indebted to the 
University of Maine School of Law for its generous research support. 
867 
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 93 
b. Procedural Modifications ................................ 904 
c. Expansion of Proceeds in Bankruptcy ............. 904 
d. Securitization in Bankruptcy ............................ 906 
VI. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR RESEARCH - THE INITIAL STUDY ....... 907 
A. The Objectives of Empiricism ............................................. 907 
B. Research Protocol -A Study in Three Parts ....................... 909 
1. Information Gathered by Interview ........................... 909 
2. Information Gathered by Survey ............................... 909 
3. Data from the Survey of Small Business 
Finances ..................................................................... 910 
VII. THE SECOND STUDY -ARTICLE 9 DEBTORS IN 
BANKRUPTCY ............................... .-.............................................. 911 
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 912 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), the state law establishing and defining the secured credit system in 
personal property,1 has undergone a massive revision.2 This com­
plicated,3 collaborative,4 arduous,5 and at times contentious,6 process 
1 Article 9, originally enacted over forty years ago, has been the subject ofa massive 
revision project, undertaken over the past ten years by the Permanent Editorial Board for 
the UCC ("PEB"), the American Law Institute ("ALI"), and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (''NCCUSL"). Article 9's revision process is 
complete, and the revised statute has been enacted into law in all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. NCCUSL, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts (2002), 
available at http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsucca9 
.asp. As stated in the Official Comment to Section 9-101: 
In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC ... established a 
committee to study Article 9 of the UCC. The study committee issued its report 
as of December 1, 1992, recommending the creation of a drafting committee 
for the revision of Article 9 and also recommending numerous specific changes 
to Article 9. Organized in 1993, a drafting committee met fifteen times from 
1993 to 1998. This Article was approved by its sponsors in 1998. 
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2001); see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM 
COMMERC!ACCODE, PEB STUDY GROUP u.c.c. ARTICLE 9 REPORT (1992) [hereinafter 
PEB STUDY]. 
2 The new Article 9 contains 126 sections. Thirty-six of these sections are 
completely new and seventy-one sections have language that was not included in former 
Article 9. "ln terms of how the law is expressed, it would be more accurate to label ... 
Article 9 as 'new' rather than 'revised.,,, JULIAN B. McDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, 1 (1999). 
3 The goal of simplicity was arguably not met by the drafters of Revised Article 9. In 
many places its language is highly ambiguous. Although no citation beyond the language 
of Revised Article 9 is necessary, see Jean Wegman Bums, New Article 9 of the UCC: 
The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 29 (2002). The author refers 
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redefined the contours of the relationship between secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors, and debtors.7 Under Revised Article 9, secured 
creditors are granted greater rights than they had under forrner8 Article 9 
in myriad obvious and not-so-obvious ways. We now have a secured 
credit system whereby secured creditors can more easily encumber a 
her "journey through new Article 9 [as] a descent into a new tenth ring of Dante's 
Hell .... " Id. at n.11. She makes the following observations: 
[A)lmost every tree in the forest has been renumbered and moved; many old 
trees have been split into two or three smaller bushes, which the user must 
cross-reference to get a complete and accurate answer; there are few signposts 
to help one find the paths through the newly arranged forest; there are land 
mines throughout the forest, i.e., small, but significant, changes in the rules that 
only a careful reading will uncover; there are a fair number of new trees in the 
forest and some whole new groves of trees; while some of the changes bring 
major improvements to Article 9, others are counterintuitive or add entirely 
new areas of confusion; some sections of the new Article 9 are written in a 
language other than English and can only be understood if one has a preexisting 
knowledge of the law; and despite alt the new trees and pruned old trees, a 
substantial number of questions ... remain unanswered by the new Article 9. 
Id. at 33-34. 
4 PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing the various parties participating in the 
revisions process). 
5 In contrast to former Article 9, which includes five parts and fifty-five subsections, 
Revised Article 9 has six parts and 126 subsections (not including the transitional rules 
and conforming amendments). U.C.C. §§ 9-101to9--628 (2001). 
6 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Reflections of the Reporters, 74 Cm.­
KENT L. REv. 1357, 1364 (1999) [hereinafter Reflections] (referring to the "level of 
dyspepsia ... generated" by a discussion of an issue in connection with the revision); 
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, 
Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 573-76 (1998) (describing the 
tension in the Article 9 drafting process in reconciling the central reform objectives­
simplicity and the third-party effects of secured credit); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of 
Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1784 (1994) (observing that the Article 9 revision debate 
concerned the "efficiency and social value of Article 9"). 
7 Interestingly, the Co-Reporters for the drafting committee described Revised 
Article 9 as follows: "Revised Article 9 most assuredly does not embody a material 
alteration of the basic attributes of secured transactions law. As we explain more fully 
below, the revision clarifies, tinkers at the edges, refines, and generally seeks to make the 
statute more user friendly and more precise." (footnotes omitted). Steven L. Harris & 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and 
Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 92 (2001) [hereinafter Policy & Impact]. 
8 The process of drafting a uniform code governing secured credit transactions 
originally began in 1946. By 1950, the basic construct of Article 9 was completed. Seel 
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 288, 289 n.l (1965). 
Article 9 was substantially revised in 1962 and 1972. PEB FINAL REPORT (April 25, 
1991) (proposal for changes in Article 9 of UCC). Louisiana was the last hold-out state, 
finally adopting the 1972 version of Article 9 of the UCC in 1988. Act No. 528, 1988 La. 
Acts 1367-422, effective Jan. 1, 1990, (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 10:9-101 to 
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greater number of particular types of debtors' assets9 and can more 
readily securitize more types of assets with greater certainty. 10 
The revision was justified largely on grounds of efficiency. 11 It was 
argued that if secured creditors' reach is broader and transaction costs are 
lower, secured credit will be more widely available at a reduced cost. 12 
Therefore, secured !ending's efficiency will increase, meaning that the 
benefits that flow to some affected parties will outweigh the detriment to 
others.13 
This theoretical justification for Article 9's revision echoes the 
earliest explanation for the secured credit system offered by its original 
proponents.14 These scholars posited various theories in an attempt to 
explain why the gains from secured credit were greater than the 
corresponding costs. 15 These explanations were ultimately inconclusive, 
and to date the efficiency of secured credit remains unproven.16 The 
absence of a proven justification for secured credit, however, did not 
hinder the use of economic efficiency as an initial argument favoring its 
. d d . contmue use an expansion. 17 
An alternative theoretical perspective on the secured credit system 
that has gained momentum in the years during Article 9's revision states 
that in some credit markets, under certain circumstances, the gains that 
flow to secured creditors are had at the expense of unsecured creditors, 
who, as a practical matter, are unable to adjust to the risks presented by 
secured credit. 18 These creditors, including tort creditors, trade creditors, 
9 Professor Barry Zaretsky referred to the Article 9 revision as a "love feast for 
secured creditors." McDONNELL, supra note 2, at 2. 
lO Indeed, in the words of the Reporters for the Drafting Committee, "[m]any of 
[Revised Article 9's] provisions make it easier and less expensive to create and perfect 
security interests and to achieve priority over competing claimants." Harris & Mooney, 
Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360; see also G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: 
Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3 (2001). 
11 Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360. 
12 Id. at 1359-61. 
13 This is known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. To be considered Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient, the gains to one party may not exceed the losses to another. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-16 (4th ed. 1992). 
14 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for 
Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REv. 473 (1984). 
15 Jackson & Kronman, supra note 14, at 1158; White, supra note 14, at 503. 
16 Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 37 (1981). 
17 Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360. 
18 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 
1896-98, (1994) [hereinafter Creditor's Bargain]. 
Article 9 artificially and unjustifiably advantages the institution of security over 
unsecurity. It holds involuntary unsecured creditors to an entirely 
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employees, and taxing authorities, are undiversified in their "credit" 
extensions and are less able to weather losses that result from a debtor's 
secured credit arrangements. 19 According to the theory, the externali­
zation of the risk of non-payment to these parties misallocates resources 
and potentially encourages the excessive use of security.20 
Scholars have further argued that not only has the efficiency of 
secured credit not been proven, but the discussion concerning the 
wisdom ofArticle 9's changes ought not begin and end with the issue of 
efficiency.21 These scholars have posited that economic analysis offers a 
limited perspective on the policy choice of continually expanding 
secured credit.22 
Clearly, the theoretical scholarship is divided on the expected impact 
of Revised Article 9.23 Neither elaborate economic and financial 
models24 nor detailed predictive descriptions of the impact of Revised 
bargain. It holds voluntary unsecured creditors to the terms of security 
agreements to which they did not in fact agree and to which they did not have 
access. The terms of those agreements are binding regardless of how 
unreasonable they may be. This bizarre scheme subsidizes the institution of 
security, causing more secured lending than is optimal. 
Id. at I 963; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the 
Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 872-79 (1996). 
19 Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role ofInsolvency 
Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 n.35 (1994) [hereinafter Finance's Divide] (describing 
undiversified creditors as those who extend credit to a limited number of debtors or to 
debtors in limited business sectors). 
20 Bebchuk & fried, supra note 18, at 872-79. See generally C. Scott Pryor, How 
Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trnstee 's Strong-Arm Into a Weak Finger: A Potpourri of 
Cases, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229 (2001); Warner, supra note 10 (observing that 
blanket liens may now cover deposit accounts, health-care insurance receivables, and 
commercial tort claims). 
21 See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 
Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1386--87 (1997) [hereinafter Imperfect 
Information]. 
22 Id. at 1385-88. 
23 Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 
1437 (1997). 
Put simply, we still do not have a theory of finance that explains why 
firms sometimes (but not always) issue secured debt rather than unsecured debt 
or equity. Moreover (and perhaps because of the lack of any plausible general 
theory), we lack any persuasive empirical data to predict whether, in any 
particular case, a later security-financed project will generate sufficient returns 
to offset any reduction in the value (i.e., the bankruptcy share) of prior 
unsecured claims. 
Id. at 1436. 
24 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Secured Credit as a Zero Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1635 (1998). 
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Article 9 have proven the actual, societal effects of the statute.25 As has 
historically been the case in other contexts, the theoretical appraisal of 
the commercial credit system has predated empiricism.26 
It must be recognized, however, that theory and· empiricism are 
mutually dependent; a central role of theory is to channel research, and 
empiricism is employed to prove or disprove a particular theory or set of 
theories.27 When the results of empirical research corroborate a particular 
theory, the theory gains independent validity.28 Conversely, theories that 
empirical studies consistently fail to substantiate will be, and ought to be, 
abandoned.29 Theoretical thinking on Article 9 is sufficiently advanced 
so that data can be used to test developed hypotheses-.meaning specific 
statements of prediction-against their corollaries.30 A causal study will 
have as its focus the effects of a cause (the revision of Article 9) on one 
or more outcomes (impacts on and behaviors of participants in the credit 
markets). 
25 See, e.g., Warner, supra note 10, at 3-9; Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, 
supra note 7, at 85-96. 
26 This type of inquiry has been referred to as the "land of theory" (as compared to 
the "land of observation"). 
The land of theory is what goes on inside your mind, and your attempt to 
explain or articulate this to others. It is all of the ideas, theories, hunches and 
hypotheses that you have about the world. In the land of theory you will find 
your idea of the program or treatment as it should be. You will find the idea or 
construct of the outcomes or measures that you believe you are trying to affect. 
William M. Trochim, Idea of Construct Validity, available at http://www.socialresearch 
methods.net/kb/considea.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
27 JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE METHODS OF RESEARCH (3d ed. 1986). 
Empirical research, the foundation of the scientific approach, refers to any 
activity that systematically attempts to gather evidence through observations 
and procedures that can be repeated and verified by others. The scientific 
approach requires that all claims be exposed to systematic probes. Statements, 
theories, and assertions, regardless of how plausible they seem, must be 
testable. 
Id. at 7. 
28 Id. at 13. 
29 Id. 
30 Two mutually exclusive hypotheses must be identified that together exhaust all 
possible outcomes. The testing must be conducted so that one hypothesis is proven and 
one is rejected. This is known as the hypothetical deductive model of research-working 
from the more general to the more specific. See William M. Trochim, Deductive and 
Inductive Thinking, available at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.htm 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2005). "We might begin with thinking up a theory about our topic 
of interest. We then narrow down into more specific hypotheses that we can test. We 
narrow down even further when we collect observations to address the hypotheses with 
specific date--a confirmation (or not) or our original theories." Id. See infra notes 246­
58 and accompanying text for a detailed account of the empirical study's proposed 
research protocol. 
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In this article, I outline a research protocol for the study of Revised 
Article 9.31 Part II sets forth a detailed account of the most significant 
changes made to Article 9. These changes are both substantive and pro­
cedural. Part III describes the competing theories justifying the existence 
and expansion of Article 9. I discuss, in concrete terms, the variety of 
predictions made concerning the effects of the Article 9 revisions on 
debtors and creditors where the debtor is not in bankruptcy. Since the 
vast majority of secured loans (and even distressed secured loans) are not 
administered within the bankruptcy process, this is an important context 
in which to examine the statutory changes. Part IV illustrates the 
importance of empiricism and describes recent empirical studies in 
commercial law. Part V discusses business bankruptcy theory and the 
intersection between theoretical perspectives on bankruptcy and Article 
9. Part VI outlines a research protocol for the initial study of Article 9's 
impact on the credit markets. This part defines specific questions to be 
addressed, the methodology for addressing them, and the procedures to 
be followed. Part VII outlines a research protocol for the study of Article 
9's impact when a debtor is in bankruptcy. Part VIII concludes by noting 
the importance of gaining sufficient empirical information in order to 
resolve the theoretical debate concerning the impact of Revised Article 9. 
II. REVISED ARTICLE 9 
A. Secured Credit-Related Changes 
At the outset of the Article 9 revision process there was a definitive 
theoretical divide, not only concerning the wisdom of further expanding 
the statute's scope, but also concerning the fundamental issue of whether 
there ought to be some limit on the debtor's ability to pledge all of its 
assets. 32 Accordingly, the open question on the minds of those watching 
31 This article discusses Revised Article 9 in the context of the business (non­
consumer) borrower. There are distinct and definite differences between the consumer 
finance market and the commercial finance market. A discussion of the consumer finance 
market is beyond the scope of this article. 
32 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2051-53 (1994) 
[hereinafter A Property-Based Theory]. 
It seems enough that security interests, under Article 9 and real estate law 
alike, are interests in property. The legal regime for security interest reflects 
property law functionally as well as doctrinally. We believe it follows that the 
law should honor the transfer or retention of security interests on the same 
normative grounds on which it respects the alienation of property generally. 
Id. But see 1 GILMORE, supra note 8, at 248-49: 
Considerations of policy and common sense suggest that there must be a 
limiting point somewhere. Borrowers should not be encouraged or allowed 
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and waiting for the new Article 9 was how equilibrium would be struck 
between the interests of those most and least able to diversify the risk of 
a debtor's financial distress.33 More specifically, how would the law 
defining, allocating, and distributing property entitlements between 
secured and unsecured creditors be balanced so that the interests of all 
affected parties are duly recognized? 
While the drafters claim to have struck a fair balance between 
secured and unsecured creditors, on its face Article 9 departs consider­
ably from the former law governing secured transactions.34 There is the 
hypothecate all that they may ever own in the indefinite future in favor of a 
creditor who is willing to make the loan now .... And ways should be found to 
penalize a lender, who, after allowing his borrower to pile up an intolerable 
weight of debt, then claims all the assets of the insolvent estate, leaving nothing 
to satisfy other claims. 
Id. See also William J. Woodward, The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, 
Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1511 
(1997). 
33 This· has also been one of the central issues of dissension in connection with the 
recent efforts to revise the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, the efforts on the part of 
those advocating for reforms are designed to tip the balance of power in favor of those 
most able to spread the risk of financial losses. See Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on 
Debtor Bill Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al (describing efforts by the 
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition, a powerful lobbying group formed by 
members of the consumer credit industry, to push a major, creditor-friendly Bankruptcy 
Code overhaul through Congress). The success rate for three- to five-year Repayment 
plans is less than 30%. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawless/5256-passed-senate.pdf. (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
34 It was noted that the Drafting Committee "sought balance [between secured and 
unsecured creditors] at every turn." Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1363­
64. An example of the balance sought (and purportedly achieved) includes the Drafting 
Committee's failure to disrupt the ability of the bankruptcy trustee to avoid an 
unperfected security interest. Reporters for the Drafting Committee observed that "[t]he 
appropriate relationship between secured and unsecured creditors may present the single 
most important cluster of issues ...." Id. at 1358-59; see also Steven L. Harris & 
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard 
Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 569 (1993). The PEB Commentary contained the 
following explanation of its mission: 
[One could ask] ... whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that 
can be subjected to a security interest or the extent to which a debtor's property 
can be so encumbered. Or one might question whether any perfection step 
should be necessary to obtain priority over judicial lien creditors or other 
competing claimants. Or one might question whether security interests ought to 
be enforceable at all. 
Although it is well aware of challenges to the validity of some basic 
principles that underlie Article 9, the Committee chose not to undertake a 
thorough reexamination of those principles. Nor did the Committee's 
deliberations reflect strong support for making major adjustments in the 
balance that Article 9 now strikes between secured parties and unsecured 
creditors. But insofar as the Committee's recommendations would make it 
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potential for secured creditors more easily to dominate a debtor's assets, 
and thus the debtor's business, to the exclusion of other creditors' 
interests. New collateral categories have been added, the concept of 
"proceeds" has been augmented, and certain formerly non-assignable 
rights are now assignable as security. 
1. New Article 9 Assets 
A number of new categories of collateral have been added to the 
Revised Article 9. These include health-care insurance receivables,35 
commercial tort clairns,36 payment intangibles,37 and deposit accounts.38 
Each of these is discussed below. 
a. Health-care Insurance Receivables 
"Health-care insurance receivables" are listed as a new variety of 
"account."39 Interests or claims that arise under health insurance policies 
or health-care insurance receivables are new Article 9 collateral,40 except 
to the extent that Article 9 is preempted by "a statute, regulation or treaty 
of the United States ... .'"'1 Federal law provides such a stumbling block 
by prohibiting the assignment of federal government-sponsored health 
easier and less costly to take and perfect security interests, they are likely to 
have the effect of improving the position of secured parties relative to that of 
unsecured creditors. . . . The Committee believes that any necessary 
adjustments for the protection of third parties should be made directly, as by 
changing Article 9's priority rules or by modifying the avoidance powers or 
other distributional rules of the Bankruptcy Code, and not indirectly, as by 
increasing the difficulty and expense of creating perfected security interests. 
PEB STUDY, supra note l, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted); see also James J. White, Work and 
Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L REv. 2089, 2089 ( 1994) (declaring the efficiency of 
Article 9 irrelevant to the revision process). 
35 U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(2) & 9-102(a)(46) (2001). 
36 § 9-102(a)(13). 
37 § 9-102(a)(61). 
38 § 9-102(a)(29). 
39 One of the historical problems with using health--care insurance receivables as 
collateral was old Article 9's exclusion of insurance proceeds from Article 9 coverage. 
See former U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (1998) ("This article does not apply ... (g) to a transfer of 
an interest in or claim in or under any policy of insurance, except as provided with 
respect to proceeds (Section 9-306) and priorities in proceeds (Section 9-312). "). 
40 A health--care insurance receivable is defined as "an interest in or claim under a 
policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health--care 
goods or services provided .... " U.C.C. § 9-102(46) (2001). Assignments to health­
care providers (i.e., doctors and hospitals) are automatically perfected. See U.C.C. § 9-
309(5) (2002). 
41 § 
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insurance receivables.42 Revised Article 9 avoids this problem by 
separating attachment and perfection of security interests from those 
Article 9 remedies that allow direct collection from account debtors.43 
Specifically, section 9-408 invalidates restrictions on assignments that 
impair the creation and perfection of security interests in health-care 
receivables.44 This invalidation neither empowers the secured party to 
enforce the security interest nor imposes any duties on the secured 
party.45 It does, however, allow the debtor to obtain additional credit and 
permits the secured party to attach the proceeds of the health-care 
receivable in the event of default.46 
As a result of this revision, both federal and private health-care 
insurance receivables can now be used as collateral in much the same 
way as other rights to payment. 
b. Commercial Tort Claims 
· The prohibition against the use of commercial tort claims as 
collateral has also been lifted. Revised section 9-102(a)(13) defines 
commercial tort claims as those claims that arise in tort in the course of a 
claimant's business.47 The Article 9 Drafting Committee, considering the 
42 Federal health insurance programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, currently 
include provisions that prevent their assignment, and state law (meaning Article 9) cannot 
preempt federal law provisions. See Social Security Amendments of 1972 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (1994)) and the Medicare­
Medicaid Anti-fraud and Abuse Amendments to the Social Security Act (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1994)). Federal government sponsored health-care programs (i.e., 
Medicare and Medicaid) do not allow payments to be made to any person other than the 
health-care provider. Pursuant to a letter from the Acting Director of the Health Care 
Finance Agency, when the transaction involves the sale of Medicare or Medicaid 
receivables, payments may be made directly to the provider and then transferred to a 
special account that may then be accessed by the lender. Letter from Kathleen Buto, 
Acting Director of the HCF A Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, Sept. 
15, 1988, quoted in Patrick A. Guida, 1999 Financing Health Care Providers, SD71 
A.L.1.-A.B.A. 401, 421 (1999). 
43 Section 9-408 renders such contractual terms ineffective only to the extent that 
they "would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest." U.C.C. 
§ 9-408(a)(I) & (c)(l) (2001). 
44 Id. 
45 Note also that§ 9-408(d) relieves the health-care receivable account debtor from 
virtually every obligation to the secured creditor. "By making available previously 
unavailable property as collateral, this section should enable debtors to obtain additional 
credit." Id. at cmt. 8. 
46 Jd. 
47 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13) (2001). Section 9-109(d)(12) explicitly states that non­
commercial tort claims are not included within the scope of Revised Article 9. See § 9-
408 cmt. 8. ("By making available previously unavailable property as collateral, this 
section should enable debtors to obtain additional credit."). 
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fact that many jurisdictions allow the assignment of tort claims that arise 
from a breach of contract, "[saw] little reason to continue the general 
exclusion of tort claims that are otherwise assignable under non-UCC 
law.''48 
Under the Revised UCC there are some limits placed on the use of 
commercial tort claims as collateral. Commercial claims must exist at the 
time of the original agreement, meaning after-acquired tort claims 
cannot be taken as collateral.49 Moreover, the commercial tort claim must 
be described with some specificity in the security agreement-"all 
commercial tort claims of the debtor" will not do.50 
c. Payment Intangibles 
"Payment intangibles," defined as "general intangible[s] under which 
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation," are a 
new type of Article 9 collateral.51 Receivables that are not "chattel 
paper," "instruments," or "accounts" (because they do not arise out of 
property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or 
otherwise disposed of) are "general intangibles" for the payment of 
money-"payment intangibles.''52 
The classic example of "payment intangibles" is payment streams 
from the sale of loan pool participations, typically originated by financial 
48 PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 59. There is a specific exclusion for tort claims that 
arise out of personal injury or death.§ 9-102(a)(l3)(B)(ii). This is thought to be traceable 
to prohibitions against champerty and maintenance. See PEB STUDY, supra note 1, at 58 
nn.2-3 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "champerty'' as a 
"bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the 
party's claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds" and 
"maintenance" as "maintaining, supporting or assisting, the litigation of another.")). 
49 § 9-109 cmt. 15. 
so § 9-102(a)(l3). A creditor, however, can include a categorical description of 
"commercial tort claims" (and all types of collateral) in the financing statement. § 9­
502(a)(3). 
51 § 9-102(61). 
52 Id. Comment 5( d) notes that "payment intangibles" are a subset of "general 
intangibles." "Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of 
money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its 
obligation. The term 'payment intangible,' however, embraces only those general 
intangibles 'under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary 
obligation."' Id. at cmt. 5( d). General intangibles are a residual category of "personal 
property'' under Revised Article 9. Section 9-102(42) states that "any personal property, 
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, 
deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit 
rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas or other minerals before extraction" are 
general intangibles. Examples cited in the Official Comment include "intellectual 
property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper 
or an instrument." Id.; see also§ 9-102(a)(2), (11), (42), (47), & (61). 
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institutions.53 The transfer of these loan pool participations was not 
governed by former Article 9 and, accordingly, buyers of fractional 
interests of commercial loans have not customarily filed financing 
statements to perfect their interests. In the course of the Article 9 revision 
process, parties to loan pool participation transactions expressed the 
potentially conflicting desire of wanting the benefits of increased 
certainty and decreased risk provided by Article 9 perfection, but without 
the burden of required public filing. In response, the drafters provided for 
automatic perfection of payment intangibles. 54 
d. Deposit Accounts 
Article 9 now provides that businesses' deposit accounts may be 
encumbered as original collateral.ss Deposit accounts are defined to 
include demand, time savings, or passbook accounts maintained with a 
bank.56 Prior to the widespread adoption of Revised Article 9, a number 
of states enacted non-uniform amendments that included deposit 
53 Some courts have held, however, that sales of loan participations characterized by 
the parties as "sales" are in fact disguised security transactions. See, e.g., Jn re Coronet 
Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing factors indicative ofa 
disguised security transaction). Sales of payment intangibles as collateral are 
automatically perfected, whereas transfers of payment intangibles as collateral are not. 
Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1371-72; see also Paul M. Shupack, 
Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
167, 170 (1999) (noting that, under former Article 9, the cash flows from the sale of loan 
pools are deemed to be general intangibles, thus their sale is not governed by Article 9); 
U.C.C. § 9-309(3) (2001) ("The following security interests are perfected when they 
attach ... (3) a sale of a payment intangible ...."). 
54 See Shupack, supra note 53, at 179. With automatic perfection of a transfer of 
payment intangibles, secured parties run the risk that searchers of the public records will 
not discover the prior interest in their assets. Article 9 similarly allows for automatic 
perfection of the sale of promissory notes. Under Revised Article 9, a transfer of a 
promissory note as collateral for a loan may, however, be perfected by filing. U.C.C. 
§§ 9-3 lO(a), 9-312(a) (2001). The definition of"promissory note" is new and, according 
to the Official Comment, was "necessitated by the inclusion of sales of promissory notes 
within the scope of Article 9." § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). The definition reads: 
"Promissory note" means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a 
monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an 
acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of 
money or funds. 
§ 9-102(a)(65). 
55 Article 9 does not explicitly list deposit accounts as eligible original Article 9 
collateral, but expansively states that all personal property is included within its scope, 
except for that property that is explicitly excluded. § 9-109(a)(l). Section 9-109(d)(13) 
explicitly states that Article 9 does not apply to assignments of deposit accounts in 
consumer transactions. § 9-109(d)(l 3). 
56 § 9-102(a)(29). 
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accounts in their versions of former Article 9.57 In other states, common 
law provided a process for taking security interests in deposit accounts.58 
In order to further the goal of uniformity, the Revised Article 9 drafters 
included commercial deposit accounts as a new type of eligible 
collateral.59 
The perfection provisions for deposit accounts outline separate rules 
for when i) the party seeking to encumber the deposit account is the bank 
in which the account is held, and ii) the party seeking to encumber the 
account is a third party.60 "Control" (and thus perfection) is automatic if 
the bank in which the account is held is the secured party.61 Other 
secured creditors can obtain "control" (and thus perfection) by getting 
either an "authenticated"62 agreement from both the bank and the debtor, 
57 See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE§§ 4210 & 9104 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 490:9-104 
(1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. 26/9-104 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-104 (West 
1992); IDAHO CODE § 28-9-306 (Michie 1992). 
58 See, e.g., First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re 
Creekstone Apts. Assocs. ), 165 B.R. 851, 854 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994 ). 
59 Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of 
Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 963, 973 (1999). The 
author notes that, in recent years, credit and depository institutions have increasingly 
been engaged in interstate business. As such, the non-uniformity among the states under 
former Article 9 became more onerous. Under some states' non-uniform versions of 
former Article 9, creditors could take a security interest in deposit accounts as original 
collateral. Id. 
60 Perfection of original security interests in deposit accounts is not achieved by 
filing, but by the newly defined perfection concept of gaining "control." According to the 
Official Comment to section 9-104, "'control ... pursuant to the debtor's agreement' 
may substitute for an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment." 
U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 2 (2001). 
61 
"Control" is defined in section 9-104. The definition reads: 
A secured party has control of a deposit account if: 
(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is 
maintained; 
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an 
authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated 
by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit 
account without further consent by the debtor; or 
(3) the secured party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the 
deposit account. 
§ 9-104(a) (2001). 
62 The UCC defines "authenticate" as: 
(A) to sign; or 
(B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or 
similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent 
of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or 
accept a record. 
§ 9-102(a)(7). 
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granting the creditor access and rights to the account, or becoming a 
customer of the bank in which the account is held.63 
2. Relaxation ofAsset Transfer Restrictions 
In addition to adding new types of collateral, Revised Article 9 
relaxes many statutory and contractual restrictions on the transfer of 
certain assets.64 Reflecting Revised Article 9's strong policy in favor of 
free assignability, these provisions have the effect of overriding most 
restrictions on the assignment of accounts, general intangibles, promis­
sory notes, and other contract and intangible property interests.65 
Although this is not a pure "scope" provision, the anti-assignment rules 
facilitate the creation of a valid, perfected Article 9 security interest in a 
broader variety of a debtor's assets.66 
3. Expansion ofProceeds Definition 
The new definition of "proceeds" is another major change to Article 
9's scope.67 Section 9-102(a)(64) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is 
acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of 
collateral" and "rights arising out of collateral.''68 This newly crafted 
description of proceeds is designed to capture any property with a 
connection to the original collateral as proceeds.69 It eliminates the 
requirement that only collateral that has been "disposed of' gives rise to 
63 § 9-104(a). 
64 See§§ 9-406 & 9-408 (limiting certain restrictions on asset transfers). 
65 §§ 9--406 & 9-408. 
66 § 9-315(a)(2), (c). Article 9's broader "proceeds" definition includes, inter alia, 
any proceeds of sale upon the disposal of the intangible collateral, any license fees if the 
debtor is the licensor of an intellectual property right, and any property collected on, or 
distributed on account of, the collateral. § 9-102(64). Beyond obtaining a bare "security 
interest" in the non-assignable intangible right and a right to proceeds, however, the 
secured creditor receives few of the rights usually associated with a security interest. 
Because of this, the interest in a contract's value outside of bankruptcy may only be 
realized if the party with the anti-assignment provision is willing to recognize the 
security interest and consent to an assignment of the proceeds at liquidation. In such 
cases, proceeds generated from non-assignable contracts may prove to be valuable 
collateral. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non­
Assignable Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 323, 329-30 
(2001). 
67 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001). 
68 Id. 
69 Unlike a security interest in original collateral, security interests in proceeds 
attach automatically at the time the proceeds arise. The section 9-203 formalities for 
attachment are not required for a secured creditor's interest in proceeds to arise. See id. 
§§ 9-203(f), 9-3 l 5(a)(2). 
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proceeds.7° For example, payment streams from the licensing of 
intellectual property collateral fall within the section 9-102(a)(64)(A) 
definition of proceeds of the subject intellectual property, whether or not 
any portion of the underlying intellectual property was "disposed of' 
under the license.71 
Section 9-102(a)(64)(C)'s "rights arising out of collateral" language 
could potentially embrace a variety of rights associated with original 
collateral, including a broad spectrum of intangible rights. For example, 
a security interest in a copyright could conceivably reach a later­
produced derivative work as a proceed of the original copyright.72 The 
concept of "proceeds" may also include damage claims arising out of the 
"infringement of rights in" collateral, at least "to the extent of value of 
[the] collateral."73 This new definition significantly departs from the 
"disposition"-based definition of proceeds under former Article 9. 74 
4. Purchase-Money Security Interests 
As was true of its predecessor, Revised Article 9 operates on a 
system of presumptive priority for the first secured party to give public 
notice of an interest.75 Revised sections 9-103 and 9-324 provide an 
exception to this presumptive rule for those creditors who provide 
purchase money financing of goods and software. 76 Purchase money 
transactions involving software are limited to cases where the "debtor 
acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which 
it acquired an interest in the goods," and the software is principally used 
in the goods.77 This limitation forecloses purchase-money security 
interests in other types of intellectual property, thus potentially fore­
7°Former Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what "is received upon the sale, exchange, 
collection, or other disposition ofcollateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306 (1995). 
71 THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2:11 at 2-37-2-38 
(2004). Royalties and other income streams from the licensing of intellectual property are 
captured under the broader definition of "account" in Revised Article 9 and are also 
"proceeds" of the intellectual property. Id. 
72 See id; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the 
Negotiability of Information, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1375 (2002/03) ("This subsection 
provides explicitly what section 9-l02(a)(64)(C) only implies: namely, that a claim for 
infringement of rights associated with original collateral (e.g., patent and copyrights) will 
be proceeds."). 
73 WARD, supra note 71, § 2:ll at 2-37-2-38; see U.C.C. § 9-312 (1995); U.C.C. 
§ 9-301 (2001). 
74 Compare U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1995) (defining "proceeds" as "whatever is received 
upon the ... disposition of collateral or proceeds"), with U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(64) (2001) 
(broadening the definition of"proceeds" beyond that of former§ 9-306(1)). 
75 § 9-322(a). 
76 §§ 9-103 & 9-324. 
77 § 9-103(c). 
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closing "new value" opportunities in the form of intellectual property for 
debtors encumbered by blanket liens.7s 
5. Default and Fore<Josure under Revised Article 9 
Revised Article 9's section on default does much to expand the rights 
of foreclosing secured parties.79 Collection and foreclosure remedies 
have been enhanced, both substantively and procedurally.so For example, 
secured parties now have the right to exercise their collection and 
enforcement rights not only against debtors and account debtors, but also 
against guarantors and other persons obligated on collateral.s1 
Moreover, with respect to specific collateral types such as deposit 
accounts, the non-judicial collection procedures have been streamlined.s2 
For example, security interests in deposit accounts can be enforced by 
the creditor or bank in which the deposit account is held by "apply[ing] 
the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by the 
deposit account."83 With respect to other secured parties who have 
perfected an interest in a deposit account by control, the secured party 
may instruct the depository bank to pay the balance of the account to the 
secured party upon a debtor's default.84 
B. Article 9 's Securitization Revisions 
Among the more dramatic modifications made to Article 9 are those 
designed to have an impact upon securitization transactions. Securiti­
zationss is a process by which a firm raises money by selling its 
78 WARD, supra note 71, § 2:49. 
79 Moreover, Revised Article 9 attempts to offer guidance to foreclosing parties with 
respect to the requirement that foreclosure sales be conducted in a commercially 
reasonable manner by setting forth far more specific requirements with respect to notice 
of sales.§ 9-611(c)(3)(A), (B) & (C). 
80 Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement ofSecurity Interests Under Revised 
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 945 (1999). 
81 Section 9-607 states that Article 9 can be enforced against debtors, account 
debtors, and any "other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise 
render performance to or for the benefit of the secured party."§ 9-607(a)(I). This phrase 
is broad enough to include not only an "obligor" on an instrument, but also the debtor's 
rights against persons under contracts relating to the collateral, arising out of covenants, 
representations, and warranties that may have been breached. 
82 § 9-607. 
83 § 9-607(a)(4). 
84 § 9-607(a)(5). 
85 Securitization 's market predecessor was a method of finance known as factoring. 
With its origins in the I 9th-century English textile industry, factoring is the sale of 
payment streams to third parties. Since the purchaser of the receivables conducted a 
credit review of customers, the seller was both relieved of the burden of conducting a 
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receivables86 to a special purpose entity, which in turn sells the 
receivables-backed securities in the public or private capital markets.87 
The paradigmatic and most commonly securitized receivables fall within 
the Revised Article 9 definition of "account."88 Securitization allows 
purchasers of these receivables-backed assets to insulate themselves 
from many of the risks related to their originator's business, relative to 
their risks if collateral were transferred to them in connection with a 
secured loan. Their risk is reduced because the asset-backed securities 
("ABS") purchasers are subject only to the risks associated with the 
transferred assets, not to the full array of risks associated with the 
originator's business. 89 
The paramount risk that ABS purchasers seek to avoid is the 
originator's bankruptcy.90 The extent of the securitized assets' isolation 
from the originator's bankruptcy risk, however, depends upon the 
strength of the transaction's structure, which in turn is a product of the 
legal regime governing the transaction.91 
credit review and able to readily liquidate its assets so that it could purchase more raw 
materials. See SUSAN CRICHTON & CHARLES w. FERRIER, UNDERSTANDING FACTORING 
AND TRADE CREDIT 7-9 (1986). 
86 Neither former nor Revised Article 9 defines the term "receivables." For purposes 
of this article, the term "receivables" is defined as payment obligations owed to a 
company from a third party. 
87 JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988). Professor Tamar Frankel, in her treatise on 
securitization, broadly defines "securitization" as the transformation of an asset into 
securities. This definition includes both loan participations as well as the substitution of 
securities for loans. TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, 
FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 4-5 ( 1991 ). 
88 U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(2) (2001). 
89 Among them are the risks of principal concern to secured creditors: exposure to 
external events such as business downturns, interest-rate fluctuations, management 
decisions, and, most importantly, the originator's insolvency or bankruptcy. See 
ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 87, at 8-9, 42-43. 
90 See id. at 42-43. "Generally, ... [securitized assets] are insulated from the risk of 
an originator's bankruptcy by structuring the transaction so that the underlying assets are 
not the property of the originator." Id. at 43. Moreover, the asset purchaser, in contrast to 
the secured creditor, is not a "party in interest" in the securitizing debtor's bankruptcy 
case. Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "party in interest" to include "the 
debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a 
creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee .... " 11 U.S.C. § l 109(b) 
(2000); see also In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(stating that, for standing purposes, "party in interest" is reserved to one that is able to 
assert an equitable claim against the estate). 
91 See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 
76 Tux. L. REv 595 (1998) [hereinafter Asset Securitization] (describing the risks to 
which traditional asset-based lenders are subject); Shane Kite, Insiders' Predictions 
Point to Maturing Market, ASSET SALES REP., Oct. 18, 1999 ("In terms of credit risk, the 
phrase 'bankruptcy remote' is sounding thinner and thinner, say insiders, as most feel the 
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Since its original enactment, Article 9 has governed not only 
traditional secured transactions, but also the sale of accounts.92 Because 
the distinction between assets sold and assets transferred as security is 
often blurred, Article 9 has always required public notice filing for both 
types of transactions.93 There was a dark cloud of uncertainty, however, 
hanging over the heads of many investors of securitized assets under the 
legal protection offered to bond investors from an issuing company's credit troubles has 
been oversold."); Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can Be 
Securitized-But Quality May Be Iffy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64 (quoting a rating 
agency managing director urging caution to ABS investors); see also Dinsmore v. 
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin (In re Towers Financial Corp.), 135 F.3d 
83 7, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1998) (the originator and five SPCs filed for bankruptcy protection, 
resulting in substantial losses for Tower's ABS investors). But see In re Carter Hawley 
Hale Stores, Inc., No. LA 64140 JD Chapter 11, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2186 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. July 30, 1991) (holding that debtor's "assignment and sale of the property'' relieved 
the debtor from other liability under the agreement); In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 
1992 Bankr. LEXIS 392 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, Jan. 10, 1992) (where the court, in both 
cases, respected the bankruptcy remote structure of the transaction). A recent Bankruptcy 
Court opinion, in connection with its issuance of a cash collateral order, said the 
following about the debtor's securitized assets: 
[T]here seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest that Debtor does not 
retain at least an equitable interest in the property that is subject to the interim 
order. Debtor's business requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various 
metal products. To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in 
products that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be derived 
from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the court concludes that 
Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the inventory and receivables, and 
that this interest is property of the Debtor's estate. This equitable interest is 
sufficient to support the entry of the interim cash collateral order. 
In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
92 The original version of Article 9, enacted in 1962, governed the sales of"contract 
rights." The term "contract rights" was originally defined in Article 9 as "any right to 
payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an 
instrument or chattel paper." This definition meant that once performed, some contract 
rights became accounts and others became general intangibles. As such, under the 
original version of Article 9, the statute potentially governed the sale of general 
intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962); see GILMORE, supra note 8, at 379. The definition of 
"account" in the 1972 Amendments to Article 9 (the first version adopted by all fifty 
states), however, was narrowed in scope from its original definition. Sales of contract 
rights and other general intangibles were excluded (but the sale of chattel paper was 
included). Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a 
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1992); U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) & (b) 
(1998); see also Morton M. Sult, Accounts Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 ARl.z. L. REv. I (1969) (describing accounts 
receivable financing prior to the enactment of Article 9 and under the UCC). 
93 The definition of "security interest" in section 1-20 l (37) includes the interest of 
the "buyer of accounts ... subject to Article 9" as a security interest. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) 
(2001 
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old Article 9 regime. While Article 9 governed the sale of accounts,94 
many commonly securitized assets fell outside the definition of 
"account," and it was not always clear, or if clear it was not always easy, 
for transferees to perfect their interests in these assets.95 Perhaps because 
there was so much money to be made by so many participants, this 
cloudiness did not inhibit the enthusiastic growth of the market for 
securitized debt.96 
Notwithstanding robust participation in the securitization market 
over the past decade and a half, there remained the problem of a 
discrepant legal regime governing securitizations.97 In an attempt to 
reconcile the governing law with common securitization transactions, the 
Article 9 drafters included a wider variety of rights to payment arising 
from the transfer of rights in both tangible and intangible property within 
Revised Article 9's definition of "account."98 The sale of the right to 
94 Id. Fonner article 9 also governed the sale of chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-
102(l)(b) (1995). 
95 The asset-backed securities market began in 1985 when the Sperry Corporation 
originated the first true securitization, in which it sold $192 million lease-backed notes in 
the public markets. The second deal was originated by General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, in which eight billion dollars between late 1985 and 1986 was securitized. 
Three investment banking organizations captured the bulk of the lucrative commissions 
from these deals. Seeing an opportunity to expand into this market, at least fourteen 
major investment banks began aggressively seeking asset-backed security issuances to 
underwrite. See Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the 
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 538-39 (1995). 
See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 91, at 608--09. The article states: 
Following [the] early [ securitization] transactions, firms became 
increasingly more creative and began securitizing automobile loans, leases, and 
credit card receivables. As the market for ABS has expanded in recent years, 
issuers have become even more imaginative with respect to the type of 
receivables securitized. Examples of recently issued [asset-backed securities] 
include bond issuances backed by unpaid real estate taxes, securities backed by 
hotel and hospitality receivables, taxi cab medallion-backed securities, 
securities backed by the excess spread from previously issued credit card 
securitizations, securities backed by health-care receivables, and securities 
backed by government-contract receivables. 
Id. at 602--03 (citations omitted). The total debt owed by issuers of asset backed securities 
(excluding mortgages) was $713 billion at the end of 1995. By the end of September 
2001, it was $2.02 trillion. See Board of Gov. of Fed. Res. System: Summary of Credit 
Market Debt Outstanding, 88 FED. 
 REs. BULL. A40, tbl. 1.59 (2002). 
96 Lupica, Asset Securitizaton, supra note 91, at 608--09. 
97 Id. at 610; see also Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial 
Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 559 (2001) (examining the statutory 
structure governing securitization transactions). 
98 Revised Section 9-102(a)(2) now reads: 
[A) right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by 
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, 
assigned or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be 
886 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 93 
payment ansmg from the sale, lease, license, or assignment of com­
mercial and consumer loans (including credit card receivables), leases, 
public utility and hotel services, insurance and franchise payments, and 
income streams from the license of intellectual property, will all give rise 
to "accounts" under Revised Article 9.99 
As a final "belt and suspenders" provision, Revised Article 9 also 
includes new section 9-318, which states that "a debtor that has sold an 
account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note" (all 
commonly securitized assets) retains no "legal or equitable interests in 
the collateral sold."100 While this provision does not determine whether a 
transfer is a sale or a loan, 101 if the transfer is determined to be a sale 
under non-Article 9 law, 102 section 9-318 makes "explicit what was 
implicit"-that the debtor retains no interest in the receivables sold.103 
(iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary 
obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided, 
(vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii) arising 
out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use 
with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated 
or sponsored by a State or governmental unit of a State .... The term includes 
health-care-insurance receivables. The term does not include (i) rights to 
payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, (ii) commercial tort 
claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) investment property, (v) letter-of-credit 
rights or letters of credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced 
or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or 
information contained on or for use with the card. 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001). As noted above, Article 9 sales coverage is further 
expanded to include payment intangibles and promissory notes. Loan pool participations 
are paradigmatic payment intangibles. Article 9 provides for the automatic perfection of 
transfers of loan participations. See§ 9-109(a)(3) ("[T]his article applies to ... a sale of 
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes."). 
99 See§ 9-102(a)(2). For example, the securitization of payments from the licensing 
of intellectual property are accounts and thus subject to the filing and priority rules of 
Revised Article 9. The securitization of securities backed by royalty streams from the sale 
of music has recently become a more common phenomenon. Investment banker David 
Pullman, architect of the first such deal-the sale of assets backed by David Bowie's 
royalty stream--observed, "There is a tremendous shift in wealth from hard assets-steel 
and manufacturing-to intellectual property, entertainment." Kathy Bergen, 100 Shares 
ofPavarotti? Stars Turn to Securitization, SUN-SENTINEL (Miami), Dec. 6, 1997, at 16C; 
see also Joe Queenan, Dead Men Earning, FORBES, Mar. 22, 1999 at 253; Brendan 
Weston, The Bonds Formerly Known as Artists, ROB MAGAZINE REPORTER, May 1999. 
100 § 9-3 l 8(a). 
101 This state-law determination turns largely on the extent to which the transferor 
has transferred the risks of the asset's collectability. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. 
Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1979). 
102 Historically, the Bankruptcy Code has relied upon non-bankruptcy law to define 
property interests under the Code. When the issue is whether a transfer of Article 9 assets 
is properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate, the nature of the transfer, as 
well as the necessary steps to establish the transferee's property rights, has always been 
determined by state law. Recently, Congress tried to change this. There was a provision 
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C. Article 9 's Procedural Revisions 
1. Single Place to File and Supergeneric Descriptions 
In an effort to improve the functional efficiency of the secured 
transactions system, Revised Article 9 simplifies the procedures for the 
perfection of Article 9 security interests. 104 For example, in contrast to 
the complicated rules setting forth office or offices in which secured 
creditors should file their financing statements (which turned on the 
category of asset taken as collateral, as well as whether such asset was 
tangible105 or intangible106), Revised Article 9 provides for a single place 
to file against all of a debtor's assets. 107 Secured parties seeking 
perfection no longer have to determine the location of their debtor's 
collateral or worry about whether it has been moved. The often-clouded 
issue of locating the debtor's "chief executive office"108 is eliminated by 
Revised Article 9's new rule for determining the location of the debtor. w9 
Secured creditors seeking to perfect security interests in debtors who are 
corporations, partnerships, or limited liability companies will file their 
financing statements in the jurisdiction where the debtor entity was 
organized. 110 The new Article 9 rule eliminates the need for creditors to 
included in the original draft of the Bankruptcy Reform legislation redefining the concept 
of "estate." Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 912 (2000). Such 
redefinition would have removed from the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction "eligible 
assets" transferred by the debtor to an "eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed 
securitization." "Eligible assets" are defined to include commonly securitized receiv­
ables. This provision would have been a dramatic change in the law defining estate 
property. Id. In 2001, this provision was removed from the Bankruptcy Reform bill. See 
Glenn R. Simpson & Susan Pulliam, Congressional Negotiators Drop Measure in 
Bankruptcy Bill Tied to Enron Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2001, at A4. 
103 U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2 (2001). 
104 Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360. 
105 Under former Article 9, a party seeking to perfect its security interest against 
tangible assets had to file a financing statement in the jurisdiction where the assets were 
located. See U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995). 
106 Former Article 9 provided that security interests against intangible assets could 
be perfected by filing in the jurisdiction where the debtor was located. See§ 9-103(3)(a) 
& (b). 
u.c.c. § 9-301 (2001). 
U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1995) ("A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of 
business ifhe has one, [and] at his chief executive office ifhe has more than one place of 
business .... "). 
9 10 u.c.c. § 9-307 (2001). 
llO Id. Section 9-307(e) states, "A registered organization that is organized under the 
law of a State is located in that State," thus determining that for a "registered" entity, the 
place to file is the place of organization. § 9-307(e). This results in a corresponding 
headache for searchers, although not as much of a headache as looking everywhere 
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make judgment calls about where businesses are located and to chase 
inventory, equipment, and debtors as they move from state to state in 
order to maintain perfected status. 111 
Another striking change to Article 9 permits secured parties to use 
"supergeneric" descriptions of collateral in financing statements. 112 
Typically, supergeneric collateral descriptions .read, "all the debtor's 
assets."113 Multi-page attachments enumerating every item of collateral 
or collateral type are no longer necessary for secured parties to take a 
blanket lien on a debtor's assets. These rules are simplifications of the 
formalities Article 9 requires that will, in effect, make it easier to perfect 
and maintain a blanket lien and harder for secured parties to make 
mistakes. 114 
2. Two-Tier Perfection Rules 
Revised Article 9 includes a two-tier rule for omissions in financing 
statements. 115 Pursuant to section 9-502(a), only three types of errors in 
the financing statement make it vulnerable to a bankruptcy trustee's 
"strong ann" 116 challenge: the omission of i) the debtor's name, ii) the 
creditor's name, or iii)· a description of the collateral.117 There are, 
however, additional requirements that the financing statement must 
satisfy in order to be accepted by the filing office;118 it must include the 
organization had tangible assets under old Article 9. For a non-registered organization, a 
debtor is located "at its place of business."§ 9-307(a) & (b). 
111 To illustrate, a secured party will file a financing statement in the Maine 
Secretary of State's office to perfect a security interest in the assets of Smith's 
Provisions, Inc., a Maine corporation, with inventory and equipment located in New York 
and Pennsylvania and its principal place of business in New Hampshire. If the chief 
executive office of Smith's Provisions, Inc., moves to another state, or if inventory or 
equipment is relocated, unlike under former Article 9, a creditor having filed a financing 
statement in Maine would remain fully perfected. 
112 See § 9-502(a)(3) ("a financing statement is sufficient only if it ... indicates the 
collateral covered by the financing statement"); § 9-504 ("A financing statement 
sufficiently indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: ( 1) a 
description of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108; or (2) an indication that the 
financing statement covers all assets or all personal property."); § 9-108(a) ("if it 
reasonably identifies what is described"); § 9-504 cmt. 2 (stating that a financing 
statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it covers "all assets or all personal 
property"). 
113 § 9-108(c) & cmt. 2. 
114 Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 99-101. 
115 § 9-502(a). 
116 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the avoidance of unperfected 
security interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000). See generally Pryor, supra note 20. 
117 § 9-502(a). 
118 §§ 9-502(a), 9-516(b)(S)(C), 
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debtor's jurisdiction of organization, organizational type, and 
organizational identification number.119 If, however, notwithstanding the 
absence of any or all of this "required" information, the financing 
statement is accepted by the filing office, the secured party, while not 
perfected in a priority contest between it and another secured creditor or 
purchaser, is deemed validly perfected when subject to the scrutiny and 
powers of the debtor's bankruptcy trustee.120 Thus, it is less likely that a 
filed creditor will have its security interest defeated by a bankruptcy 
trustee than it is that a creditor with a flawed financing statement will 
lose a priority contest against another secured creditor or purchaser. 
Moreover, with respect to certain specified types of collateral, 
Revised Article 9 similarly makes it easier to protect secured creditors 
from the bankruptcy trustee's strong arm. For example, security interests 
in deposit accounts can be perfected by third-party creditors gaining 
"control"121 over the account, but that secured party is vulnerable to 
defeat by the bank in which the account is held if the bank exercises its 
right of setoff. 122 A secured creditor that has established "control" over a 
deposit account, however, is fully secured in a contest against the trustee 
in bankruptcy. 123 
There is a similar rule with respect to instruments. 124 For example, a 
transfer of instruments may be perfected by filing, and such perfection 
will defeat the interest of the bankruptcy trustee. 125 Perfection by 
possession, however, is required to win a priority contest with another 
secured party or a purchaser.126 
119 §§ 9-502(a), 9-516(b)(S)(c), 9-520(a). 
120 §§ 9-338(1}-{2), 9-502(a). 
121 See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text. 
122 
"Setoff'' is defined as "a debtor's right to reduce the amount ofa debt by any sum 
the creditor owes the debtor; the counterbalancing sum owed by the creditor." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (7th ed. 1999). 
123 §§ 9-104(a), 9-3 l 7(a). 
124 
"Instruments" are defined in Section 9-102(a)(47) as: 
[A] negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the 
payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, 
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery 
with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include 
(i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a 
right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information 
contained on or for use with the card. 
§ 9-102(a)(47). This was the rule under former Article 9, too. 
125 § 9-312(a). 
126 §§ 9-330(d), 9-312(a), 9-314(a). This has been the rule under former Article 9 
with respect to "investment property." A secured party seeking to perfect an interest in 
investment property could file a financing statement. That filing, however, would not 
defeat the interest of a competing secured creditor or purchaser. It would, however, defeat 
the interest of a trustee in bankruptcy exercising its strong arm powers. See U.C.C. § 9­
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III. THEORY AND REVISED ARTICLE 9 
A. The Theoretical Defense ofRevised Article 9 
As described in Part II above, Revised Article 9 is a significant 
departure from the former version of Article 9. Clearly, the changes 
made were designed to enhance the effective operation and efficiency of 
what has been viewed by some as a very effective and theoretically 
defensible statute. 127 Each specific revision was included to address a 
perceived problem or deficiency in the old statute. 128 
The revisions were premised on the idea of increased efficiency­
gains to secured creditors would outweigh any losses to third parties.129 
The gains enjoyed by secured creditors include a lower lending risk and a 
correspondingly increased chance of repayment. The lowered risk results 
from the lender's enhanced ability to monitor and control a debtor's 
behavior, the initial diligence concerning the identified collateral, and the 
lender's greater confidence in the value of the collateral relative to 
debtor's cash flow. 130 Proponents of Revised Article 9 predicted that the 
changes would make it "easier and less expensive to create and perfect 
115(5) (1995). Revised Article 9 carries this rule forward with respect to investment 
property. See§§ 9-312(a), 9-314(a). 
127 Harris & Mooney, A Property-Based Theory, supra note 32, at 2052-53. The 
authors state: 
The positive value of permitting debtors to give security freely and 
effectively suggests two important rules of thumb to be followed in the process 
of revising Article 9. First, the drafters should purge Article 9 of obstacles to 
the creation of effective security interests. Because there is nothing generally 
unsound or suspect about the creation of effective security interests, formalistic 
requirements that upset the intentions of the parties and prove to be traps for the 
unwary should be eliminated. Second, the scope of Article 9 should be 
expanded. Many of the common-law rules governing the creation of security 
interests in personal property are uncertain and cumbersome. Insofar as the 
creation of security interests is easier, less costly, and more certain under 
Article 9 than under common-law rules, expansion of the statute is likely to 
serve the overarching goal of effectuating the will of the parties. The drafters 
should add limitations and restrictions only when they are demonstrably 
warranted in particular circumstances. Moreover, the presumption against 
interference with party autonomy should extend to existing impediments (e.g., 
public notice requirements) as well as to proposed new ones. 
Id. 
128 Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 8~8. 
129 Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360. 
130 See generally, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured 
Transactions: Foxes with Saxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 13 (1993) 
(describing attempts by legal scholars to provide economic justifications for secured 
credit). 
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security interests and to achieve priority over competing claimants."131 
As argued, Revised Article 9's expanded scope and procedural 
simplifications, in enabling creditors to take security interests in a greater 
number and type of assets with greater facility, simply make a good thing 
better. 132 
B. A Competing Vision 
Not surprisingly, a competing vision has been put forth of what may 
result from Article 9's revision. First, if streamlining procedures and 
expanding Article 9's scope results in an increase in the availability and a 
decrease in the price of secured credit, it may also have the pernicious 
effect of raising the price of unsecured credit. 133 Further, because Article 
9 offers the enhanced potential for a dominant secured creditor to 
encumber all of a debtor's assets, subsequent financing may be more 
difficult to obtain.134 This may result in reduced cash flow, which 
correspondingly may mean that trade creditors, employees, tort 
claimants, and other undiversified creditors135 will be compromised.136 
The Article 9 revision may also have an impact on the business 
bankruptcy process. 137 A secured creditor, by virtue of its blanket 
security interest, places constraints on a debtor's decision with respect to 
both its assets and its business. Once bankruptcy is filed however, such 
constraints become control over the debtor's reorganization.138 Such 
control by a dominant secured party, as a proxy for the privatization of 
business bankruptcy, has far-reaching implications. 139 
131 Harris & Mooney, Reflections, supra note 6, at 1360. 
132 Harris & Mooney, A Property-Based Theory, supra note 32, at 2053. 
133 Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren 
Carve-out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1469 (1997); LoPucki, Creditor's 
Bargain, supra note 18, at 1898; Warren, Imperfect Information, supra note 21, at 1386. 
134 Klee, supra note 133, at 1475. 
135 Undiversified creditors are those that lend in one (or few) industries. See Adler, 
Finance's Divide, supra note 19, at n.35. 
136 LoPucki, Creditor's Bargain, supra note 18, at 1898; Lynn LoPucki, The Death 
ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-16 (1996) [hereinafter Liability]. 
137 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 
795, 837-43 (2004) [hereinafter The Control ofWealth]. 
133 Id. 
139 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End ofBankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REv. 751, 784-85 (2002) [hereinafter Endo/Bankruptcy]. 
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N. BEYOND THEORY TO EMPIRICISM 
Even if one or more of the above-described theories is intuitively 
appealing, its predictive power remains unproven.140 There has been no 
comprehensive empirical study of Revised Article 9's effects on the 
credit markets or on the bankruptcy process verifying or disproving any 
academic theories advanced. 141 The execution of such a study would 
bring a higher level of confidence and objective certainty to the various 
"conclusions" concerning the effects of the secured credit system than is 
possible based merely on speculation and prediction. Once we have 
objective, scientifically verifiable information about the effects of 
secured credit, many of us will have to modify our "theories, opinions 
and beliefs" in accordance with empirical findings. 142 At that point, we 
can engage in a normative discussion about the wisdom of the unlimited 
and unqualified use of secured credit. 
A. Empiricism v. Theory - The Case o/Durrett 
The importance of empiricism in evaluating legal rule changes is 
well illustrated by what is known as the "Durrett Controversy."143 In 
1980, in the case of Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 144 the 
Fifth Circuit held that a regularly conducted, non-collusive pre­
bankruptcy foreclosure sale of a debtor's real property at less than 70% 
of the property's fair market value was voidable as a fraudulent 
140 See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642 
( 1980) ("Unless the empirical counterpart to a theoretical standard can be identified, 
advocacy of the latter cannot lead to any change in or validation of existing law."); 
Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 659, 668 (1980) 
("[T]he statement is made that ... this particular rule is the most efficient. It may or 
may not be. The only way to tell is to engage in careful research .... "). 
141 There have, however, been myriad studies of the credit markets conducted by 
business and economics scholars. None of these have endeavored to address the debate 
concerning the effects and efficiency of the continued existence and expansion of secured 
credit. See e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN, BANKRUPTCY, CREDIT RISK AND HIGH YIELD JUNK 
BONDS, at xxiii (2002) (detailing studies conducted by Professor Altman and other 
scholars of what was referred to as "the 'dark side' of Finance-bankruptcies, corporate 
distress, defaults, etc." (Preface)); Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, Trade 
Credit: Theories and Evidence, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, v. 10 n.3 (1997); ALLEN 
N. BERGER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF MARKET SIZE STRUCTURE ON COMPETITION, THE CASE 
OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Research, Working Paper 
No. 01-10, 2001); JEREMY BERKOWITZ, BANKRUPTCY AND SMALL FIRMS' ACCESS TO 
CREDIT (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9010, 2002). 
142 NEALE & LIEBERT, supra note 27, at 9. 
143 Philip Shuchman, Data on the Durrett Controversy, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 605 
(1987). 
144 Durrett v. Washington Nat'! Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 
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conveyance. 145 When this dramatic pronouncement was made, members 
of the commercial law community expected a seismic market 
response; 146 it was widely anticipated that the availability of credit would 
contract and the price of credit would increase.147 This anticipation was 
fueled by writings critical of Durrett asserting the various adverse effects 
the rule would impose on the credit market. 148 
In seeking to determine the extent to which credit markets responded 
to the rule change announced in Durrett, Professor Philip Shuchman 
undertook an empirical study of the cost and availability of residential 
mortgage loans in states in which the Durrett rule was adopted, and he 
compared that data to the cost and availability of residential mortgage 
loans in states that rejected the Durrett rule. 149 Data was collected from a 
variety of publicly available sources, including Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board and Housing and Urban Development surveys. 150 Interest rates, 
145 Id. at 202. 
146 Shuchman, supra note 143, at 616. 
147 See generally id. 
148 Id. at 618; see also Robert M. Zinman et al., Fraudulent Transfers According to 
Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977, 1013 (1984): 
The immediate effect of the acceptance of the Durrett rule would be to chill 
bidding at foreclosure sales. Third parties will be unlikely to bid for properties 
knowing that the application of fraudulent-conveyance Jaws could set aside the 
sale at a later date. The absence of competitive bidding will in all likelihood 
reduce prices at foreclosure sales and increase the likelihood of deficiency 
judgments in those states where they are permitted. 
Id.; Lawrence D. Coppel & Lewis A. Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of 
"Transfer", 100 BANKING L.J. 676, 682 (1983) ("Du"ett ... drives bids down [on 
foreclosure sale prices] .... "). Two years following the Du"ett decision, the Ninth 
Circuit heard the case of Madrid v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., in which it similarly 
faced the question whether a non-collusive, regularly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale could be deemed a fraudulent conveyance. Among the writings critical of Du"ett 
that predicted dire and significant effects were amicus briefs in the Madrid case. The 
court in Madrid ultimately concluded that a sale under such conditions at least satisfies 
the "reasonably equivalent value" requirement of Bankruptcy Code Section 548(a)(2). 
Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (Jn re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 426-27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1982) (B.A.P.), ajf'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d l 197 (9th Cir. 1984). 
149 Shuchman, supra note 143, at 624. In the study conducted by Professor 
Shuchman, interest rates, loan to price ratios, and total real estate-related loans were 
studied between the period before Du"ett was decided and after the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984). 
150 Data for Professor Shuchman's study was collected from the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (Primary Mortgage Interest Rate Surveys), the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, the Federal 
Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
the Sovran Mortgage Corporation, and HSH Associations. Professor Shuchman noted, 
"While problems can arise from QRaXQLIRUPmethods of data collection, in the gross 
terms we employed for our purposes, the possible errors due to this artifact should 
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loan-to-price ratios, and the number of real estate acquisition loans were 
measured in the relevant jurisdictions before and after the Durrett 
decision. 151 
The study revealed that the Durrett rule had little, if any, impact on 
the market for real-estate-related financing. 152 Though Professor 
Shuchman cautiously offered possible alternative causes for the absence 
of a market response to the Durrett ruling, 153 there was sufficient data to 
logically deduce that the "claimed societal effects" of the Durrett rule 
were without basis. 154 Professor Shuchman observed that many of the 
pre-study conclusions concerning the effects of the Durrett rule on the 
market were derived from theoretical models, not "the known sets of 
empirical facts."155 He cautioned legal scholars and other commentators 
against drawing conclusions concerning the causal effects of new legal 
rules based solely on theories untested by empirical study. 156 
B. Empiricism and Revised Article 9 
The path to the empirical study of Article 9 has recently been forged, 
and this early empiricism will go far to help form the contours of more 
comprehensive studies to come. 157 With the objective of explaining how 
distort matters. The numbers of mortgages and the total dollar amounts are so great that 
the variations should be relatively small." Shuchman, supra note 143, at 624-25. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 615-16. 
153 See id. at 637--40 (setting forth eleven "other possible and plausible explanations 
for the before-and-after data" in his study). 
154 Id. at 640--41. 
155 Id. at 618. 
156 Id. at 618-19. Recognizing tbe limited scope of his study, Professor Shuchman 
observed that no one had proved "the conventional economic model[,] which holds that 
the perception of increased risk flowing from what will or what might happen in tbe 
legal process ... [would] have dramatic effects on the mortgage market." Id. at 619. 
Indeed, recent studies in behavioral economics have called into question the accuracy of 
the traditional wisdom that markets readily respond to changes in legal rules. Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, The Economic Analysis ofBankruptcy Law and the 
Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1679, 1691-92 (1998) (noting skepticism that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Barnhill v. Johnson (holding that a payment to a lender is 
deemed to be made when the payment check is honored by the debtor's bank for 
purposes of preference law) would be reflected in an increase in the price of credit); 
Symposium, Contemporary Issues in Bankruptcy and Corporate Law, Panel Discussion 
and Question-Answer Session, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 571 (1992). Professor David 
Gray Carlson noted that "not every change in the law produces a change in the price of 
credit" and further observed that the extent to which the market responds to changes in 
the law is an empirical question. Id. 
157 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Essay: Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 Tux. L. REv. 1117 
(2002); Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 159, 233 (1997) [hereinafter Strategy and Force]; Ronald Mann, 
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the credit markets work in practice, two scholars have made recent 
contributions that help place many of the questions concerning the 
workings of the credit markets in their proper context. 158 Though the 
narrow scope and abbreviated methodology of these studies invite a more 
extensive empirical study, 159 a number of interesting and intuitively 
appealing observations were made. 
First, it was observed that there is not one market for credit, but 
many. 16° Factors such as the size of the business, the nature of the 
business, the type of assets a firm has, and the circumstances in which a 
firm finds itself,161 all have an impact on whether, and the extent to 
which, secured credit is used. 162 Thus, conclusions drawn in a study of 
one market segment will not necessarily be valid as applied to another 
segment. 
Moreover, there are a variety of transaction structures that have the 
"paradigmatic features" of secured debt. 163 These include the grant of a 
security interest in all of a debtor's assets (otherwise known as a "blanket 
lien"), as well as in part of a debtor's assets, including a targeted security 
interest in certain specified assets. 164 Additionally, a "secured credit" 
transaction can take the form of a transfer of assets as collateral, or the 
securitization or sale of liquid assets, commonly known as receivables.165 
Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 628-29 (1997) 
[hereinafter Explaining the Pattern]. 
158 Hill, supra note 157; Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157. 
159 In the study conducted by Professor Hill, twenty lawyers, bankers, and business 
people with expertise in the credit markets were interviewed. Hill, supra note 157, at 
1117. Similarly, Professor Mann's studies were based on twenty-three interviews with 
participants in the credit markets, as well as three case studies, each one with a separate 
type of lender. Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 631; Mann, Strategy and 
Force, supra note 157, at 235. 
160 Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 628-29. There is "relatively 
infrequent use of secured credit by [large] companies." Id. at 626; LoPucki, Liability, 
supra note 136, at 14 ("[S]ecured debt strategies ... are employed primarily by small, 
relatively uncreditworthy businesses."); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory ofSecured 
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 940 (1986) ("Most secured debt is issued by 
relatively small, young, and growing firms."). One scholar who has studied the market 
noted that "as a borrower's financial strength increases, secured credit becomes a less 
attractive alternative." Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 674. 
161 The factors by which firms can be distinguished include credit history and 
quality. Hill, supra note 157, at 1124. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1124-26. 
164 Id. at 1124-25. An example of this type of grant of security is inventory and 
accounts financing. Id. at 1141. 
165 Id. at 1125. Professor Hill also includes a description of a lease financing 
transaction, making the point that: 
The longer the term of the lease relative to the life of the asset, the more 
leasing resembles secured debt. . . . A continuum exists between the most 
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Not all firms can or will engage in all varieties of secured transactions, 
and therefore explanations concerning the use of secured credit are not 
likely to hold across market segments. 
Beyond the description of the types of borrowers that access the 
secured credit market, it was further reported that the experience of 
managing a lending relationship may be somewhat different than 
assumed. 166 According to some survey respondents, the legal framework 
governing secured transactions sets forth a system where a debtor's 
behavior is guided toward secured lender repayment well before loans 
fall into distress. 167 Belying the traditional perspective that Article 9's 
grant of a right to repossess and liquidate collateral is at the center of a 
creditor's motivation in taking a security interest, the study observed that 
the strategic aspects of the secured lending arrangement were more 
important to secured lenders than their ability to ultimately force a liqui­
dation of collateral.168 Instead, most secured lenders holding distressed 
loans were paid either from the cash flow resulting from the borrower's 
continued operation, from the debtor's sale of the collateral, or from the 
proceeds of the debtor's refinancing.169 Because the liquidation value of 
collateral rarely, if ever, approaches the value of an outstanding loan, the 
Article 9 foreclosure and sale provisions were viewed by the lenders 
surveyed as the repayment option of last resort. 170 By strategically using 
collection devices outside the scope of Article 9's remedial provisions, 
lenders in the majority of cases studied were paid in full. 171 
The "strategic pressure" that most influences creditor repayment 
begins long before a debtor's financial distress. 172 This pressure includes 
the lender's ability to limit subsequent borrowing, to exert leverage to 
encourage repayment, and to motivate the borrower not to engage in 
risky behavior.173 Although these behavior-maximizing incentives all 
operate in the shadow of Article 9 remedies, the study concluded that 
there was limited reliance by lenders on the formal statutory liquidation 
lease-like lease (such as a short-term lease of a water cooler) and a debt-like 
lease (such as a long-term lease of an aircraft); much leasing falls somewhere 
in the middle. 
Id. at 1128 (footnotes omitted). 
166 Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 157, at 233. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 233-36. 

169 Id. at 234. 

170 Id. at 164. 

171 Id. 
172 The issue of leverage in negotiation has been assiduously studied in negotiation 
theory literature. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets 
Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 
(2000). 
173 Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157, at 641. 
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processes. 174 Control over the debtor's business and behavior offered the 
primary benefit to secured lenders. 175 
V. REVISED ARTICLE 9 AND BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY THEORY 
When a business debtor files for bankruptcy, a lender's "strategic 
pressure" to coerce repayment will be to no avail. Once the bankruptcy 
system is accessed, voluntary repayment is no longer an option and the 
distributive baseline with respect to creditors' interests in debtors' assets 
is established by Article 9. 176 As such, changes made to the Article 9 
rules have the potential to resonate far more loudly in bankruptcy. 
Depending upon how one sees the theory and purpose of the bankruptcy 
system,177 this may or may not be a positive development. 
A. Critics ofJudicially Supervised Reorganization 
The business bankruptcy system continues to be the subject of 
intense scholarly debate. 178 Some scholars have been openly critical of 
the current business bankruptcy system, with many of these critics 
subscribing to what has been characterized as the contract theory 
174 Id. at 639-41. 
175 Id. at 641. 
176 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created 
and defined by state law."). 
177 For a survey of current bankruptcy scholarship, see Douglas G. Baird, 
Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 577 (1998) (referring to those 
holding each of the two primary perspectives on business bankruptcy as "proceduralists" 
and "traditionalists"); see also JANIS SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
34-50 (2003) (identifying four general bankruptcy theories: 1) Market Theory, under 
which "clarif[ying] priority of creditors' claims" is the sole objective; 2) Debt Collection 
Theory, under which "bankruptcy's normative policy objective is to collectivize the 
process by which a debtor's assets are made available to claimants"; 3) Rehabilitation 
Theory, under which the "preservation of the firm as an ongoing entity" is a primary 
objective; and 4) Enterprise Theory, under which "enterprise value maximization" is the 
"normative objective of corporate decision making"). 
178 The issue of whether and to what extent the bankruptcy system ought to be 
reformed has been before Congress for four consecutive congressional sessions. While 
much of the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation has targeted the consumer 
bankruptcy system, reform of the business bankruptcy system has also been part of the 
legislative agenda. Chapter 11 has been criticized for being both inefficient and 
ineffective. There has been no legislative provision, however, to directly abolish 
business reorganization. See I I U.S.C. § 365 (2000) (allowing for the acceptance or 
rejection ofexecutory contracts); 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000) (allowing for the avoidance 
by the trustee ofunperfected security interests). 
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approach to bankruptcy. 179 Adherents to this theoretical approach posit 
that business bankruptcies today are dominated by a single controlling 
party. 180 Indeed, in recent years contract theory bankruptcy scholars have 
focused their energy on advancing criticism of and alternatives to the 
traditional judicially supervised chapter 11.181 For example, in a recent 
article, Professors Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen declared 
chapter 11 obsolete and offered three central arguments in support of this 
declaration. 182 First, they claimed that where firms' assets are largely 
fungible, going concern value is an antiquated notion. In the absence of 
specialized, firm-specific assets, there is nothing unique to be preserved 
through reorganization that could not be deployed and utilized in another 
enterprise.183 Second, they argued that bankruptcy-court supervision of a 
firm as a surrogate for responsible management is no longer necessary, 
179 Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 319-24 (1993); Baird & Rasmussen, End of 
Bankruptcy, supra note 139, at 758-59. , 
180 Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 139, at 784--85. Baird and 
Rasmussen explain: 
The revolving credit facility, installed as the firm begins to have trouble 
making debt payments, also gives the lender who runs it the ability to control 
the firm inside of chapter 11 as well as out. Most large firms that enter chapter 
11 lack enough free cash flow to operate without debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing. The control that the lender has over cash collateral makes it hard to 
enter into a financing arrangement without its explicit blessing. Its blessing can 
be contingent upon many things, including a requirement that the firm be sold 
as a going concern within a fixed period of time. At other times, the lender may 
give the current managers one more chance to turn around the fortunes of the 
firm, but it may be time constrained. A sale of assets may not be required 
immediately, but the DIP lending agreement may require that the assets be sold 
if the firm is not cash flow positive in a relatively short time. In other words, it 
is the lender, and not the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy judge, that is 
deciding how long the managers will have to make a go ofthings. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
181 THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 218-24 
(1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter II, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor~ Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Chapter JI.' An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573 (1995); see also 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chapter I J, in 1 NEW pALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW 219, 221-22 (1998). 
182 See generally Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy, supra note 139; Douglas 
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter JI at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673 (2003). 
But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and 
Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REv. 645 (2003) [hereinafter, The 
Nature] (offering empirical evidence to refute Baird and Rasmussen's claim that chapter 
11 has become obsolete as a means for firms to reorganize). 
ID Baird & Rasmussen, End. ofBankruptcy, supra note 139, at 773. 
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given that control rights are commonly vested by contract in the hands of 
a dominant lender. 184 This lender is functionally the residual owner of the 
firm and therefore its interests are perfectly aligned with those of the 
enterprise.185 Finally, they asserted that the market for distressed firms 
has become more sophisticated so that court supervised reorganizations 
are not only unnecessary, but irrelevant. 186 Firms that have continued 
viability can be more efficiently sold than rehabilitated. 187 
The development of theoretical alternatives to chapter 11 's messy, 
multi-party, negotiated process have gained momentum largely because 
of the supposed inefficiencies in the current system and because of the 
perceived inequities inherent in the compromise of secured creditors' 
property interests.188 Revised Article 9, with its facilitation of the encum­
brance of all of a debtor's assets, may result in striking changes in the 
operation of chapter 11, toward a "secured-party-in-control" model. 189 It 
remains to be proven through empirical study whether Article 9's 
revision has dictated this direction of bankruptcy policy. 
B. The Value ofReorganization 
There are scholars, however, who challenge the "control rights 
account of modem chapter 11 practice."190 Moreover, our current 
judicially supervised business bankruptcy system continues to have its 
champions.191 These scholars recognize chapter 11 as imperfect but, with 
some adjustment, still capable of embracing positive normative 
objectives beyond the repayment of a single controlling creditor.192 
Chapter 11 not only allows for the enhancement of creditor welfare but is 
184 Id. at 778. 
185 Id. at 786. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 784. 

188 Id. 

189 Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 12. 
190 Stephen J. Lubben, The "New and Improved" Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 848 
(2005). 
191 LoPucki, The Nature, supra note 182. This study was conducted using Professor 
LoPucki's database of public companies who have filed for bankruptcy. See generally 
Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, available at http://lopucki.law. 
ucla.edu (last visited Mar. 14, 2004). Teresa A. Sullivan et. al., The Use of Empirical 
Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196 
(observing that "empirical research is vitally needed in the formation of bankruptcy 
policy''). 
192 Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An 
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1197 (2005) [hereinafter Contracting Out of 
Bankruptcy] (setting forth empirical data demonstrating that a debtor in bankruptcy 
negotiates myriad economic as well as non-contractual obligations). 
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also capable of facilitating the preservation of a debtor's going concern 
value. 1 3 §
Chapter 11 also provides a structure that makes apparent the central 
role an insolvent firm may play in a micro- or macro-economy. 194 A 
multitude of parties beyond traditional debt and equity holders have an 
interest in a firm at the time of its insolvency, including employees, 
suppliers, customers, and members of the firm's greater community. 195 
This perspective rejects the narrow view that the sole policy objective of 
bankruptcy law is to maximize the recovery of a dominant party or 
parties holding formalized claims. 196 
In response to the scholars decrying the obsolescence of chapter 11, 
Professor Lynn LoPucki offers both reason and empirical evidence as 
proof that chapter 11 continues to have a function and a purpose. 197 He 
first refutes the claim that going concern value is an anachronistic 
notion. 198 He identifies "going concern value" not only as the value that a 
group of assets, functioning as a unit, will generate in the future, but also 
as the value embodied in the relationship between a firm and its fungible 
assets, and finally as the value in the full range of the know-how and 
expertise possessed by the firm's high-level and low-level workers. 199 
The very real value that results from these relationships would not 
survive a market sale. 200 
Second, LoPucki challenges the notion that there is a universal 
contract capable of placing a single residual owner of a firm in control 
193 According to adherents to this approach, chapter V, given its inherent flexibility, 
continues to have "unrecognized" and "underemphasized virtues." William C. Whitford, 
What's Right About Chapter Jl, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1381 (1994). 
194 Moreover, in addition to its powers to preserve going concern value, chapter 11 
has the additional virtue of inherent flexibility. Chapter 11 offers the possibility, in 
appropriate circumstances, of creatively managing some of a viable debtor's more 
crippling obligations. Such obligations may include both tort claims and untenable 
capital structures. Bankruptcy allows for the adjustment of a firm's capital structure so 
that it can resume its operation as a going concern. There is a distinction to be made 
between financial distress and economic distress. Economic distress comes about when 
a firm fails to be successful in the marketplace. A firm is in financial distress when it is 
unable to pay its creditors. JACKSON, supra note 181, at 4 ("A business is in financial 
distress when its own 'internal mechanisms for adaptation to actual or anticipated' 
demands of parties with an interest in the business are 'impaired."'). 
195 See generally KAREN 
 GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE 
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 248-49 (1997); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A 
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 763 (1991). 
196 SARRA, supra note 177, at 47. 
197 LoPucki, The Nature, supra note 182. 
198 Id. at 651-53. 
199 Id. at 652, 654-55. 
200 See generally 
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during the insolvency proceeding.201 He argues that a firm's residual 
interest is often held more broadly and investors with different priorities 
promote interests that conflict with each other and those of the firm. 202 
Chapter 11 's reorganization system allows a board of directors, 
constrained by their fiduciary obligations to all parties-in-interest and 
under the supervision of a bankruptcy judge, to reconcile these 
conflicts.203 Reorganization's "continued vitality" supports this claim.204 
Finally, while the market for the sale of distressed firms has 
developed in recent years, the growing number of reorganizations belies 
the claim that the chapter 11 system is obsolete.205 After citing potential 
reasons, in addition to the presence of "going-concern value," for boards 
of directors to opt for reorganization, LoPucki concludes by observing 
that many firms resist liquidations and noting that the complex reasons 
for this resistance are ripe for further study. 206 
In similarly recognizing the value of public, judicial control of the 
reorganization process, Professor Westbrook observes in a recent article 
that if there is a universal contract that places a single residual owner of a 
firm in "control" during a bankruptcy, as asserted by the "contract­
ualists," it is a dominant secured creditor.207 Contending that the secured 
credit system is central to the discussion of "control" of a business 
debtor's bankruptcy, Westbrook observes that there is a direct relation­
ship between "contractualism and a dominant security interest."208 He 
argues that if the "contractualists" are correct in asserting that business 
bankruptcy has moved from a multi-party negotiated process to a control 
model, secured credit law is the "necessary and singular stronghold of 
the ... privatization of [business bankruptcy] because a security interest 
provides the institutional mechanism for control of that process."209 
The revisions made to Article 9 may provide support for the theory 
that business bankruptcies are now controlled by a single party. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that this position is overstated-not 
201 Id. at 661. "The residual owner of a firm is the investor who will reap the 
marginal dollar of gain or suffer the marginal dollar of loss from the firm's activities. If 
such an investor exists, it is the perfect person to control the firm. Its interests and the 
firm's interest are identical." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
202 Id. at 662. 
203 Id. at 665. 
204 Id. at 664--65. 
205 Id. at 670. 
206 Id. at 667-69 (describing how a firm's sale upsets implicit agreements between 
the original board of directors, shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties­
agreernents that often prompted each party to make its respective financial, contractual, 
or societal commitment with the firm in the first place). 
207 Westbrook, The Control ofWealth, supra note 137, at 798. 
20s Id. 
209 Id. 
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borne out by the evidence of how the statute is working in practice. If the 
contract theorists are correct and one dominant party, the secured 
creditor, controls the bankruptcy process, two unaddressed issues remain: 
the unproven efficiency of secured credit and the dominant secured 
party's bias in controlling a reorganization that has an impact on third 
parties and on the debtor as an enterprise.210 
1. The Worst Case - Article 9 's Impact in Bankruptcy 
a. Debtor-in-Bankruptcy's Cash Flow 
If one sees virtue in the continued availability of a judicially 
supervised business reorganization system, revisions made to Article 9 
raise compelling concerns. Fundamentally, these revisions may increase 
both the circumstances in which a dominant secured creditor has control 
of a debtor's business reorganization and the scope of that control. 
To illustrate, myriad provisions in Revised Article 9 facilitate the 
encumbrance of the debtor-in-possession's cash.211 The Bankruptcy 
Code designates encumbered cash as "cash collateral"212 and, because the 
risk of dissipation or loss is greater with cash than with less liquid assets, 
there are specific limitations on its use by the estate.213 For example, a 
debtor-in-possession must segregate and account for any cash collateral 
in its possession, custody, or control.214 Moreover, cash collateral may 
not be used without either the secured creditor's or the bankruptcy 
, . . • 215
court s pnor perm1ss10n. 
There is, however, a correspondingly greater need by the debtor-in­
possession for cash than for other types of unencumbered assets.216 This 
210 Id. at 838-53. 
211 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). In many reorganizations, the debtor-in-possession 
is granted the power and authority of the trustee in bankruptcy and is charged with the 
responsibility of administering the estate for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. Id. 
212 As defined by the Bankruptcy Code, cash collateral includes "cash, negotiable 
instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents 
whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an 
interest ...." I I U.S.C. § 363(a) (2000). 
213 § 363(c)(2)-(4). 
214 § 363(c)(2). 
215 § 363(c)(4). 
216 In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R. 720, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) 
(noting that without cash collateral a debtor could not reorganize); Sun-Bank/Suncoast 
v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.), 9 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) 
(noting that "few, if any" debtors could successfully reorganize without cash collateral); 
In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (recognizing the necessity of a 
debtor's use of cash collateral rents in the first months following a bankruptcy in order 
to conduct its business during the reorganization effort); In re Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R. 
389, 393 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1993) (same). 
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need comes from the financial demands of employees, suppliers, and 
others who are working for and with the debtor-in-possession as it 
attempts to reorganize.217 
An example of how Article 9 facilitates the encumbrance of a 
debtor's cash flow is found in its inclusion of commercial deposit 
accounts as original collateral.218 Banks hold substantial business 
deposits and provide a significant portion of business credit.219 Now that 
deposit accounts may be encumbered as original collateral, the cash in 
such accounts is more likely to be encumbered. If the account is 
encumbered, then it is not simply cash upon a debtor's bankruptcy but 
rather "cash collateral."220 As such, the debtor must get either the secured 
creditor's or the court's permission to use the cash in the account. If such 
permission is granted by a court, "adequate protection" of the secured 
creditor's interest must be provided,221 which requires the use of other 
unencumbered assets.222 Because of the ease with which secured 
creditors can obtain a blanket lien on all of a debtor's assets,223 it is much 
less likely that there will be any unencumbered assets for adequate 
protection and thus less likely that a court could grant permission for a 
debtor-in-possession to use its cash collateral. 
In a related manner, the expanded definition of proceeds may result 
in less unencumbered cash with which to reorganize.224 Since the new 
definition of proceeds includes a wider range of assets generated by the 
original collateral, there is an increased chance that the debtor will have 
"cash collateral" rather than unencumbered cash in its deposit 
accounts.225 For example, if royalties from the licensing of intellectual 
property are deposited into a debtor's bank account prior to a bankruptcy 
217 Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. 
U. L REv. 499, 500--01 (1994) (describing chapter 11 as a "prelude to liquidation since 
most chapter 11 cases fail," but also positing that even a failed chapter 11 may be 
considered a proceeding that "gets a business in the bankruptcy system, subject to the 
scrutiny of a judge and of creditors and usually headed toward an orderly liquidation"); 
see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan (/n re Waltham Watch Co.), 185 F.2d 791 
(I st Cir. 1950). 
218 See discussion infra Part ILA. I .d. 
219 Markell, supra note 59, at 975. 
220 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay); § 363 (defines and limits trustee's powers to 
dispose of estate property); § 364 (governs trustee's ability to obtain credit and incur 
debt on behalf of the estate). 
221 § 361 (providing that a secured creditor is entitled to the "value" of its security 
interest, providing a non-exhaustive list of adequate protection of this entitlement, and 
permitting the court to order a collateral substitute or some other interest that is the 
"indubitable equivalent"). 
222 Id. 
223 See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying 
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filing, such funds will become the "cash collateral" of the creditor 
holding a security interest in the intellectual property as original 
collateral. Accordingly, these funds are available to the bankruptcy estate 
only after court (or creditor) approval.226 
b. Procedural Modifications 
The Revised Article 9 procedural modifications also have the 
potential to be more pronounced in bankruptcy. Many of Revised Article 
9's two-tier perfection rules, including the diluted financing statement 
information requirements applicable when a security interest is chal­
lenged by the bankruptcy trustee, may have the effect of subverting the 
trustee's strong arm.227 The trustee's strong-arm power has historically 
been exercised to "free up [certain] assets [in bankruptcy], that could not 
be reached ... outside of bankruptcy."228 The new two-tier perfection 
rules have the opposite effect. They allow for the perfection of security 
interests in certain assets in bankruptcy that would likely be deemed 
unperfected and thus unencumbered under state law.229 
c. Expansion ofProceeds in Bankruptcy 
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the expanded definition of 
proceeds impacts debtors and other creditors in ways it does not outside 
of bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, creditors are paid from the assets that are 
included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. A bankruptcy estate is 
automatically created upon a debtor's bankruptcy filing and includes "all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
226 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A)-(B). In addition, secured creditors with a claim to 
proceeds deposited in commingled accounts will no longer be limited to proceeds 
received within ten days of bankruptcy. Equitable tracing principles, such as the "lowest 
intermediate balance rule," are an expressly recognized way of determining which 
commingled assets are identifiable proceeds of the creditor's original collateral. Former 
section 9-306(4)(d) limited creditors' claims to proceeds in commingled accounts to 
those proceeds received within ten days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. U.C.C. 
§ 9-306(4)(d) (1995). See U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 3 (2001) (permitting any means of tracing 
allowed by other law when identifying proceeds in commingled account). 
227 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)-(b) (2000); see also Pryor, supra note 20, at 245. See 
discussion infra Part II.B.3 on Revised Article 9's two-tier perfection rules. 
228 Warner, supra note I 0, at 27. 
229 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 775, 809 (1987) 
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Policy] (observing that given the difficulty many secured 
creditors have realizing the value of their collateral upon a debtor's default, many may 
prefer the one-forum benefits offered by the bankruptcy system); Warner, supra note 
I0, at 31 ("[T]he priority of secured credit[ ors] should not be recognized in bankruptcy 
unless the notice oflien [is] meaningful notice."). 
2004-2005) THE IMPACT OF REVISED ARTICLE 9 905 
commencement of the case,'mo "wherever located and by whomever 
held."231 The bankruptcy estate also includes "[p]roceeds, product, 
offspring, rents, or profits of or from property ofthe estate. "232 
The Bankruptcy Code makes a sharp distinction between "proceeds" 
of collateral and other after-acquired collateral. Section 552 of the 
Bankruptcy Code recognizes security interests in proceeds of pre­
petition collateral, but does not recognize security interests in assets 
acquired by the debtor post-petition that are not deemed to be 
proceeds.233 The interesting and difficult question is whether the expan­
sion of the Article 9 definition of "proceeds" will expand the meaning of 
the term "proceeds" under the Bankruptcy Code.234 
Currently, the courts are split as to the proper interpretation of the 
term "proceeds" under § 541 and § 552 of the Bankruptcy Code. Some 
courts have used a liberal federal bankruptcy law definition that em­
phasizes the rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy law.235 Others have 
applied former Article 9's definition.236 Still others rely on the legislative 
history of § 552 to create a definition of proceeds that is more liberal 
than former Article 9's.237 If Revised Article 9's broad definition of 
proceeds is adopted by bankruptcy courts, what was after-acquired 
property will become proceeds, and, accordingly, there will be a greater 
number of encumbered assets in a debtor's bankruptcy estate and a 
230 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l) (2005). 
231 § 54l(a); see also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 274-81 
(1997). Property subject to security interests (collateral) is included in the estate, is 
subject to the automatic stay and turnover orders, and may be used by the debtor in 
furtherance of its reorganization if deemed necessary for the reorganization to be 
effective. If the court deems collateral necessary for an effective reorganization, the 
secured creditor is granted adequate protection, but any motion to lift the automatic stay 
will be denied. Contrast this with property the debtor has sold in connection with a 
securitization, which is generally not included in the estate-<me reason securitization 
attracts investors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 364(d), 541 (2000). 
232 TABB, supra note 231, at 284-85. 
233 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)--{b). 
234 See generally WARD, supra note 71, at§§ 4:57-4:59. 
235 Casey v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the 
concept of proceeds in bankruptcy under section 54l(a)(6) is broader than the Article 9 
conception). 
236 See Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042, 1045-47 (10th Cir. 
1993) (stating a security interest in stock dividends was not perfected because the 
dividends were not received in exchange of stock that was disposed of, as per § 9­
306( 4)); Bumper Sales, Inc. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 
1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding Article 9's definition of"proceeds" established the 
scope of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)); J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of 
Chicago (In re J. Cotton Farms, Inc.), 779 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1985) (a security interest 
in receivables and accounts extended to a payment received post-petition). 
237 S. REP. No. 95-989 at 82, 83 (1978) (stating the term "proceeds" is not limited to 
the technical definition of that term in the UCC); H. REP. No. 95-595 at 368 (1977). 
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correspondingly smaller number of unencumbered assets available for 
the debtors' residual claimants. Secured creditors may now be able to 
assert a § 552(b) secured claim to, for example, license fees, derivative 
works of a copyright, patent infringement claims, and post-petition 
rental fees. 238 
d. Securitization in Bankruptcy 
The changes in Article 9 designed to facilitate securitization 
transactions present a somewhat different issue.239 As described above, 
when a debtor engages in a securitization, it sells its cash flow to third 
party investors.240 Once sold, the cash flow is no longer part of the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate,241 even though it may have been the only 
238 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l}--(2) (2000). There is, however, a possible limitation on 
the impact of this Article 9 change in bankruptcy. Though § 552(b)(l) recognizes the 
secured creditor's lien on post-petition assets, including proceeds from pre-petition 
collateral (if applicable non-bankruptcy law and the security agreement so provide), it 
also permits the bankruptcy court, "after notice and a hearing and based on the equities 
of the case, [to order] otherwise." § 552(b)(l) & (2). This § 552(b) exception was 
intended to strike "an appropriate balance between the rights of secured creditors and 
the rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal 
Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1986). This exception is 
typically applied only to business reorganizations under chapter 11 where the secured 
party is oversecured and will come by a windfall "from collateral that has appreciated in 
value as a result of the trustee's/debtors-in-possession's use of other assets of the estate 
(which would normally go to general creditors) to cause the appreciated value." 
Delbridge v. Prod. Credit Assoc., 104 B.R. 824, 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Jn re J. 
Catton Farms, Inc., 779 F.2d at 1247 (discussing § 552(b)'s equitable exception); In re 
Patio & Porch Sys., Inc., 194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (same); Airport Inn 
Assocs., Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. (In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd.), 132 B.R. 951, 959 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (same); Wilke Truck Serv. v. Wiegmann (Jn re Wiegmann), 95 
B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989) (same). · 
239 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory 
Institutionalization ofSecuritization, 33 CONN. L. REv. 199, 200 (2000); Lois R. Lupica, 
Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. 
BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 287, 314 (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Dynamic]. 
240 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
241 Worcester County Nat'! Bank v. Xinde Int'! Inc. (In re Xinde Int'! Inc.), 13 B.R. 
212, 215 (Ballkr. D. Mass. 1981) (cautioning courts to "balance the needs of the 
creditor's protection against the debtor's likelihood of a successful rehabilitation" so 
that adequate protection requirements do not foreclose a debtor's opportunity to 
reorganize). While bankruptcy law respects non-bankruptcy property interests, 
including security interests, secured creditors are entitled in bankruptcy to receive only 
the value of their collateral, not the collateral itself. A secured creditor may merely be 
offered "adequate protection" in the form of substitute collateral or some other interest 
that is the "indubitable equivalent." 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1997). The Supreme Court has 
recognized that secured creditors' property interest in their collateral continues, 
notwithstanding debtor's bankruptcy. United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 
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cash or cash equivalent available to pay trade creditors, employees, 
consumer claims, and other unsecured creditors during the pendency of 
the bankruptcy proceeding.242 In the absence of cash flow, there will 
likely be a dearth of cash collateral as well as unencumbered cash.243 Not 
only will unsecured creditors of a securitizing originator be harmed by 
the increased chance of business liquidation, even in cases where the 
debtor is worth "more alive than dead," but repayment to unsecured 
creditors in bankruptcy may be smaller if a debtor securitizes all or a 
portion of its liquid assets than it would be if the originator offered its 
liquid assets as collateral for a loan.244 "Viewed through the lens of 
control,"245 securitization permits a party to take the economic equivalent 
of a security interest, yet opt out of its debtor's bankruptcy-leaving in 
its wake a compromised chance of the debtor's reorganization. 
VI. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR RESEARCH - THE INITIAL STUDY 
A. The Objectives ofEmpiricism 
The objective of any empirical research study is to create a higher 
level of confidence in resulting conclusions than is possible by 
prediction, opinion, or reason alone. A study of the market for credit 
must build upon the work of others-theorists and empiricists alike.246 
Drawing on the work of Hill and Mann we have learned, to date, that 
there are many segments of the market for secured debt.247 Accordingly, 
each market must be studied individually, and each study must target a 
particular market segment. 
(1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95-595 (1977); II U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(f)(3), 
l 129(b)(2)(B) (1997). 
242 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
243 See l l U.S.C. § 726 (2000); Lupica, Bankruptcy Dynamic, supra note 239, at 
290. According to the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme, secured creditors are paid the 
value of their collateral first, before any distribution can be made to any other party. 
Unsecured creditors share in a pro rata distribution of assets that remain after secured 
creditors, administrative expenses, and priority claims are paid. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 
(setting forth the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme). As the secured creditors encum­
ber more assets, fewer assets are available to any other party with an interest or claim. 
244 See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 91, at 618-35; Lupica, Circum­
vention, supra note 239, at 232--40. 
245 Jay L. Westbrook, Bankruptcy Control ofthe Recovery Process, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REv. 245, 256 (2004). 
246 There are a variety of funding sources potentially available to finance such a 
study. See, e.g., American Bankruptcy Institute Endowment, athttp://www.abiworld.org; 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges Educational Endowment, at http://www.ncbj. 
org. 
247 See Hill, supra note 157; Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 157; Mann, 
Explaining the Pattern, supra note 157. 
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As noted above, one of the enduring questions in the theoretical 
scholarship on Article 9 is whether secured debt is efficient or whether it 
enables firms to externalize liabilities on non-adjusting third-party 
creditors. The enactment of Revised Article 9 raises questions regarding 
the practical effects of the statute's expanded scope and procedural 
modifications, and the impact, if any, on borrowers' third-party creditors 
and on the bankruptcy process. Moreover, the tentative hypothesis that 
borrower repayment can be attributed to strategic pressure exhibited by 
lenders at various points in the lending relationship must also be studied 
empirically. 
The specific questions that will frame the hypotheses to be tested 
include: 
i) Have secured creditors extended more credit to debtors since the 

. Article 9 rule changes? If so, have secured creditors extended secured 

credit because of the new Article 9 rules? To what extent has Revised 

Article 9 influenced secured creditors' credit-extension decision 

making? 
ii) Have secured creditors been more inclined to encumber collateral 
since Revised Article 9's enactment? If so, to what extent? Is there an 
increased incidence of creditors taking "blanket liens?" 
iii) Ifmore assets have been typically encumbered as a consequence of 
Article 9's revision, how have trade creditors adapted? Are trade 
creditors responding any differently under Revised Article 9 than they 
did under the former rules? Are they requiring cash upon delivery of 
goods? Are they more likely to take purchase-money security interests? 
iv) Have trade creditors benefited from long-term relationships with 
debtors? Has the presence of dominant secured creditors increased or 
decreased the incidence of prompt repayment? 
v) What factors influence the decision to lend on a secured basis? On an 
unsecured basis? 
vi) What percentage of loans made were repaid in full? What percentage 
ofloans made were repaid without resort to Article 9 remedies (collateral 
repossession)? What is your institution's policy for responding to 
information that borrower repayment is threatened? 
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Based upon the foregoing issues, both qualitative and quantitative 
work must be done, especially as it relates to small business. To that end, 
I propose the design of an initial study in three parts. 
B. Research Protocol - A Study in Three Parts 
1. Information Gathered by Interviews 
The first part of the study would be a series of telephone and in­
person interviews of commercial lawyers and credit providers. With the 
cooperation of several states' bar associations, interviews would be 
conducted with a random sample of attorneys who are members of their 
bar association's commercial law sections.248 Also, the AllRegs' Lender 
Directory, a database of 20,000 lending institutions, and the Small 
Business Administration directory of lenders would be used to generate a 
random sample of various credit providers.249 Interviews would be 
similarly conducted with providers from this random sample. 
The information gleaned from these interviews would be analyzed in 
light of the information gathered from the database and the survey 
questionnaires.250 The interview component of the study, however, would 
have as its primary objective an analysis of the attitudes and information 
about the secured credit process. The interview portion of the survey 
would focus on the issue of leverage and power in the credit relationship 
and would also seek to confirm the discoveries in the quantitative portion 
of the study. 
2. Information Gathered by Survey 
A survey of creditors and creditors' attorneys working in a specific 
geographic region would be similarly conducted. Survey subjects would 
248 States with integrated bar associations will be identified. An integrated bar 
association is one to which every lawyer must earn membership prior to practicing in that 
state. Each survey recipient will be sent three items: 1) a letter of introduction describing 
the study and urging their participation, 2) the survey itself-with a deadline for 
completion, and 3) a postcard reminding them to return the survey, sent after the 
deadline. Because each survey will be anonymous, it will not be possible to determine 
who did and did not return the survey. 
249 AllRegs' Lender Directory is a database of lending institutions. It includes more 
than 20,000 lenders, servicers, institutional investors, and financial entities of all types, 
including credit unions. AllRegs' Lender Directory, available at http://www.allregs 
.corn/products/lender/default.asp. The Small Business Association also maintains a 
database of small business lenders. U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA Certified 
and Preferred Lenders, available at http://www.sba.gov/gopher/Local-Information/ 
Certified-Preferred-Lenders/. 
250 See infra Part VI.A.2 describing survey questionnaires. 
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be selected in the same way interview respondents were selected. The 
survey would include dichotomous questions251 and questions that 
attempt to measure on an interval level,252 both of which are ultimately 
susceptible to quantitative analysis. Findings from the analysis of survey 
responses would be used to develop the framework for the quantitative 
component ofthe study. 
3. Data from the Survey ofSmall Business Finances 
There is excellent publicly available data concerning the financial 
practices of small business borrowers. The Federal Reserve Bank, in 
cooperation with the United States Small Business Administration, 
conducts a study of small business borrowers every five years. Known as 
the Survey of Small Business Finances ("SSBF"),253 this study collects 
data concerning roughly 4000 small business borrowers, which are 
defined as firms having fewer than 500 employees.254 The database 
includes information about loans applied for and granted to the target 
businesses, as well as the extent to which they were collateralized.255 The 
source of credit is divided between bank loans,256 non-bank financiers,257 
251 A dichotomous question is one with two possible responses (i.e., yes or no). See 
William M.K. Trochim, Types ofQuestions, at http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/ 
ques1{Ee.htm (Apr. 2, 2005). 
The most common types of interval level questions ask the respondent to respond 
to a question on a 1-5 rating scale, with "I" meaning "strongly disagree" and "5" 
meaning "strongly agree." Id. 
253 This was formerly known as the National Survey of Small Business Finances 
("NSSBF"). 
254 The 1998 data can be accessed at Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Small 
Business Finances, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf 
98home.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). This database is publicly available and includes 
information about borrowers, coded by organizational form (S-corporations, C­
corporations, LLCs, or partnerships), whether the business is family owned, the education 
level of the firm owner, whether the firm is in a service business, whether the firm is 
rated as "significant risk" or "high risk" by Dun & Bradstreet, and whether the firm had 
bad credit. "Bad credit" exists if the firm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy 
within the past seven years, the principal owner was delinquent on personal obligations 
within the past three years, the firm was delinquent on business obligations within the 
past three years, or judgments were rendered against the owner within the past three 
years. Id. 
255 See id. 
256 Bank loans include loans from commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and 
loans. See id. 
257 Non-bank financial sources include loans from credit unions, finance companies, 
insurance companies, brokerage or mutual fund companies, leasing companies, mortgage 
companies, and venture capitalists. See id. 
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and non-bank, non-financial sources.258 The 1998 database is currently 
available, and the 2003 database is expected to be released in June 
2004.259 These data reflect the behavior of small business borrowers 
under the former Article 9 regime. The 2008 data (expected to be 
released in 2009) will reflect the behavior of borrowers operating under 
the Revised Article 9 rules.260 
These data would be analyzed to determine the relative incidence of 
secured and unsecured credit among borrowers surveyed. Borrowers' 
credit risk would be correlated with the type of borrowing engaged in 
(secured or unsecured), as well as with the type oflender. 
VII. THE SECOND STUDY -ARTICLE 9 DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY 
To objectively understand the impact of Revised Article 9, the statute 
must also be studied in the context of a business debtor's bankruptcy. 
Business debtors that access the bankruptcy system, for purposes of a 
study, can be divided into small companies (less than 500 employees), 
large but privately held companies, and public companies. 
Building upon the work done as part of the Business Bankruptcy 
Project,261 the same questions set forth in Part VI above-what are the 
practical effects of Article 9's expanded scope and procedural modi­
fications, and the impact, if any, on third party creditors of borrowers­
must be asked in the context of bankruptcy. In addition, further questions 
arise concerning the recovery of general creditors with and without 
dominant secured creditors. A further issue for study will be the extent to 
which the bankruptcy process was controlled by a single party, and the 
nature of that party (ex ante creditor, ex post lender). 
A random sample of small business debtors' bankruptcy files from 
several districts would be examined to identify both the nature of the 
collateral taken by the original, pre-bankruptcy lender and the type of 
collateral being offered to the debtor-in-possession lender. Files of 
debtors who declared bankruptcy when their financing arrangements 
were governed by former Article 9 would be examined and compared 
258 Non-bank, non-financial sources include loans from other business firms, 
families or individuals, government agencies, supplier loans, credit cards, check clearing, 
factoring, loans from the owner herself, and loans from a retirement account. See Federal 
Reserve Board, Survey of Small Business Finances, available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/ssbf98/ssbf98home.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
259 Telephone Interview with John Wolken, Senior Economist and Principal 
Investigator, Federal Reserve Board (Feb. 23, 2004). 
260 Id. 
261 Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out ofBankruptcy, supra note 192; Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Financial Characteristics ofBusiness Bankruptcy, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 499 (1999). 
912 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 93 
with files of debtors who filed for bankruptcy following Revised Article 
9's enactment. The results of such a study would be controlled to prove 
or disprove a causal relationship between Revised Article 9's expanded 
scope and any identified effects in bankruptcy. The practical implications 
of such a study, however, would be dictated by one's normative 
perspective on the function and purpose of business bankruptcy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Revised Article 9 has redefined the contours of the relationship 
between secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and debtors by granting 
secured creditors greater rights than they had under former Article 9. 
These revisions were made at a time when there was neither consensus as 
to secured credit's theoretical justification nor empirical evidence to 
support any of the theories justifying or criticizing the unqualified use of 
secured credit. In the absence of empirical evidence, in a world of 
conflicting theories it is difficult to defend legal reforms that encourage a 
further expansion of the secured credit system. 
Moreover, the revision of Article 9 may have dictated the future 
course of the bankruptcy system without resolving the normative debate 
on the function and purpose of business bankruptcy. When viewed 
through the lens of bankruptcy, with its focus on satisfying the interests 
of the collective, Article 9's distributive scheme raises compelling 
concerns. As a result of the Article 9 revisions, when a debtor files for 
bankruptcy, assets that are inadvertently encumbered,262 assets acquired 
post-petition, assets described in flawed documentation, and the debtor's 
cash flow, are all diverted from unsecured to secured creditors to a far 
greater degree than was the case under former Article 9. 
The question whether the Revised Article 9 rules are inconsistent 
with or adverse to bankruptcy policy was raised by scholars commenting 
on the final version of Revised Article 9.263 One response was that the 
question was "incoherent" because "allocating property rights (such as 
priorities) cannot conflict with bankruptcy policies. "264 Adhering to that 
logic, Article 9 could have been revised to allow secured creditors to take 
secret liens in every conceivable type of property265 without even a nod 
262 My Point is not that unsecured creditors under former Article 9 relied on sloppy 
commercial lawyering to receive their "fair share" of the debtor's assets in bankruptcy, 
but rather that new Article 9's "pass" for secured creditors who do not comply with the 
basic formalities of the attachment and perfection procedure has the potential to 
redistribute wealth from unsecured to secured creditors. 
263 Harris & Mooney, Policy & Impact, supra note 7, at 94. 
264 Id. 
265 See Warren, Imperfect Information, supra note 21, at 1386 (suggesting (though 
not requesting the drafters to get any "new ideas") that security interests in body parts 
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to any other third party's (or even the debtor's) interests and still have 
been perfectly consistent with bankruptcy policy. As long as bargains 
between the debtor and its creditors were consensual with the limits of 
that bargain defined by state law, then bankruptcy, in deference to state 
law rules, would simply be a process for administering that allocational 
bargain from an inadequate resource pool. Secured creditors would get 
everything and control the process and unsecured creditors would be left 
with nothing. Moreover, all bankruptcies would be swift liquidations, 
notwithstanding the presence of a going concern value, because there 
would be no resources to use in reorganization. The question how might 
Article 9 potentially affect bankruptcy and the range of interests implicit 
in bankruptcy is not only coherent but incalculably important. 
Without the results of an empirical study, it is impossible to estimate 
what the actual effects of the revision will be either in or out of 
bankruptcy. There remain many unanswered questions. An empirical 
study of Revised Article 9's impact will add much to the debate 
concerning the impact and the wisdom of secured credit. 
would allow certain parties to get either credit they otherwise could not obtain or more 
favorable credit terms, and that the threat of foreclosure (on a cornea!) would provide a 
strong incentive for repayment). "Revised Article 9 is not an amendment so much as a 
reconfiguration of current law." Corrine Cooper, Preface to THE NEW ARTICLE 9 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Corrine Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000); see also Melissa M. 
Perry, Comment, Fragmented Bodies, Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science 
and Medicine, 51 ME. L. REv. 169 (1999). 

